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OSHA and the Sixth Amendment:
When Is a "'Civil"Penalty Criminal
in Effect?
By MICHAEL H. LEVIN*

Introduction
Great confusion has arisen over the "criminal" or "civil" nature of

various sanctions prescribed by Congress to implement particular regulatory schemes. These designations may be crucial, since a penalty
deemed to be "criminal" may be enforced only by proof of guilt be-

yond a reasonable doubt and procedures consistent with the mandate
.ofthe Sixth Amendment, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'
To the extent that these constitutional requirements are incompatible

with civil and administrative process, any finding that a regulatory
sanction meant to be imposed expeditiously is "criminal in effect" may
well paralyze its meaningful enforcement.
Using the controversial "civil" money penalty scheme of the Occu* B.A., 1964, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1969, Harvard University; B. Litt.,
1970, Oxford University. Member, Supreme Court and Circuit bars. Counsel for Appellate
Litigation (OSH), Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.;
Deputy Director, Interagency Task Force on Workplace Safety and Health, Rosslyn, Virginia. The opinions in this article are solely the author's and should not be attributed to the
Department, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or any other governmental entity.
For a related article on the scope and content of OSHA's express criminal sanction
under 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1970), see Levin, Crimes Against Employees. Substantive Criminal
Sanctions Under the OccupationalSafety and HealthAct, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717 (1977).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696-701
(1975); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359-63 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36364 (1970).
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pational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)2 as a vehicle for analysis, this article attempts to develop a consistent methodology for
classifying regulatory sanctions as either civil or criminal in character.
The author first summarizes OSHA's legislative history, showing how
that history .yields a typically mixed collection of individual motives
and makes efforts to resolve the classification issue by rote reference to
congressional purpose largely futile. Next, the author examines the
3 the
antecedents and progeny of Kennedy v. Mendo:a-Marinez,
Supreme Court's major attempt to distinguish civil sanctions from
criminal ones. He demonstrates that those decisions are riddled with
inconsistencies arising from the Court's continued failure to reconcile,
or even acknowledge, the tensions between two competing approaches
to the classification problem: a "subjective intent" theory that defers to
"civil" motives expressed by legislators prior to a statute's enactment,
and an "objective" theory that depends upon both textual evidence and
the ability to attribute a nonpenal purpose to prescribed sanctions, regardless of particular legislators' subjective intent. The author then
proceeds to demonstrate that this same failure of reconciliation characterizes and largely explains the formalistic nature of the two leading
appellate decisions validating OSHA's "civil" penalty scheme, which
adopt one or the other of these opposed approaches virtually without
discussion of the reasons for their divergent choices. Finally, the author suggests general criteria for grappling with the difficult questions
of the courts' role and the limits of congressional power that underlie
the civil-criminal issue. Utilizing these criteria, he concludes that the
decisions sustaining OSHA's explicitly "civil," administratively-imposed money penalties were correct, though partly for the wrong
reasons.
I.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Its Legislative
History

The Occupational Safety and Health Act, passed to "assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions," 4 empowers the Secretary of Labor to
enforce mandatory workplace standards with a broad arsenal of administratively-imposed "civil" money penalties.5 However, the statute
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
3. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
5. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to issue mandatory safety and health
standards applicable to all employers affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5),
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as initially proposed was much narrower in scope and was to be imple654(a)(2), 655 (1970). Although the Justice Department may prosecute employers in federal
district court for violations deemed to warrant the filing of criminal charges, the Secretary is
responsible for implementing civil sanctions. The enforcement procedure consists of three
distinct steps: citation, administrative hearing, and appellate review by a court of law.
The citation stage begins when an authorized representative of the Secretary investigates workplace conditions (either on his own initiative or in response to a complaint) to
determine whether an employer has violated either a specific health and safety standard, id
§ 654(a)(2), or his general duty to furnish a workplace "free from recognized hazards that
are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees." Id §
654(a)(1). The phrase "recognized hazards" is a term of art that has been construed to
encompass not only those dangers of which an employer has actual knowledge, but also
those dangers of which he should be aware in light of the prevailing knowledge within his
industry. E.g., Brennan v. OSHRC (Republic Creosoting Co.), 501 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th
Cir. 1974); Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Labs., Inc.), 494 F.2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1974).
However, the term does not encompass situations where an employee engages in "idiosyncratic" self-exposure to a known danger against which his employer has taken reasonable
preventive steps. See Cape & Vineyard Div. of New Bedford Gas v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d
1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Div.), 502 F.2d 946, 951-52
(3d Cir. 1974); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266-67 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 570-71 (5th Cir.
1976). The relevant provision of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970), authorizes a federal
investigator to conduct an inspection "without delay" in order to secure evidence of noncompliance. However, the Supreme Court has very recently held that a warrant requirement subject to flexible "administrative-cause" standards must be implied before a
nonconsensual OSHA inspection may be conducted. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 46
U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. May 23, 1978).
If a violation is discovered, the Secretary may, within six months after its occurrence,
issue a citation specifying both the nature of the violation and the time period prescribed for
its abatement. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a)-(c) (1970). He may also propose a variety of penalties,
depending upon the nature of the offense in question. If the employer is guilty of willful or
repeated violations of safety and health standards or of the general duty clause, he may be
assessed a "civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation." Id § 666(a). Courts
have differed concerning the meanings of the terms "willful" or "repeated" in this context.
The Third Circuit has effectively defined these words to connote bad intent, an obstinate
refusal by an employer to comply with known workplace standards. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1976) (defining the term "repeatedly"); Frank Irey,
Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1975) (defining the term "willful"). Other
courts have rejected this narrow interpretation, stating that the term "willful" refers only to
cognition and encompasses violations committed in careless disregard of workplace standards. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (9th Cir.
1977); Intercounty Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1072 (1976); United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975). If
a violation is neither willful nor repeated, but rather is serious, ie., creates "a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm could result," 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970), the
cited employer must be assessed a "civil penalty" of up to $1,000, provided he knew of the
facts constituting the violation or could have discovered them with the exercise of reasonable
diligence. Id § 666(b), (j). If a violation is neither willful nor repeated nor serious, the Act
nevertheless provides for discretionary imposition of a civil penalty of up to $1,000. Id §
666(c). While a serious violation is defined by the act to require a showing of scienter (or, at
least, lack of diligence) and no such requirement is specified for non-serious offenses, the
courts have differed over whether knowledge is an element of a non-serious violation.
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mented through largely penal sanctions. The original bill, 6 introduced
by Congresswoman Lenore Sullivan in 1965 to protect workers directly
exposed to hazardous materials, provided for enforcement almost entirely by criminal means.7 While not phrased in exclusively penal
Compare Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (6th Cir. 1976) and Brennan v.
OSHRC (Hendrix), 511 F.2d 1139, 1143-45 (9th Cir. 1975) (indicating that knowledge is an
element) with Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 655 n. 11(8th Cir.
1976) and Brennan v. OSHRC (Interstate Glass Co.), 487 F.2d 438, 442-43 n.19 (8th Cir.
1973) (indicating that knowledge is not an element).
Section 666 of the Act also provides certain criminal sanctions. Thus, if an employer
willfully violates a safety and health regulation and that infraction results in a fatality
among his employees, he can be "punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both"; if it is his second such offense, the
severity of the penalty is doubled. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1970). Similarly, anyone giving
unauthorized advance notice of an inspection is subject to a $1,000 fine and/or six months in
prison, id § 666(), and anyone making a false representation or filing a false statement is
subject to a maximum fine of$ 10,000, or six months' incarceration, or both. Id § 666 (g).
Civil citations and penalties that are not contested by employers Aithin fifteen working
days after their issuance become final and unreviewable by either courts or pertinent agencies. Id § 659(a), (b). Those that are contested in a timely manner are prosecuted by the
Secretary of Labor before administrative law judges of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC), an independent administrative court. Id §§ 659(c), 66 1(i).
All hearings before such judges are governed procedurally by the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976), and the Federal Rules of E idence, 29 C.F.R. §
2200.72 (1977). The report of the judge becomes the final order of the Commission within
thirty days, unless the parties convince the full Commission to grant discretionary review.
29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.90-2200.91a (1977). Thus, the initial proceedings are entirely administrative; while the Act does contain a provision allowing the Secretary to sue alternatively in federal district court to recover assessments exacted by the
Commission, that provision bars collateral relitigation on either the issue of liability or the
amount of the assessment. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1970).
A final order of the Commission is reviewable by an appropriate federal court of appeals under the substantial evidence rubric, which makes conclusive those findings of fact by
an administrative body that are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a
whole. Id § 660(a). For the leading decision on the nature and scope of the substantial
evidence rubric, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 487-90 (1951).
See also Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
6. H.R. 1179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Ill CONG. REc. 88 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Sullivan Bill].
7. The Bill provided that "Whoever violates or fails to comply wAith. . . any regulation adopted to carry out the provisions of [this Act] . . . shall be guilty of an offense and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished for each offense by a fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both." Sullivan Bill, supranote 6, at § 8. It
was limited in scope as well as structure and purpose, reaching only employers "having
employees engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." Id at § 4. See
92ND CONG.,

IST SESs., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND

HEALTH ACT OF 1970 at 1080-84 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.] This volume conve-

niently collects all relevant bills, debates and committee reports.
The Sullivan Bill was reintroduced in succeeding Congresses, including the NinetyFirst, which enacted OSHA. H.R. 1323, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CoNo. REc. 122 (1967);
H.R. 909, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 75 (1969). See also S. 2864, 90th Cong.,
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terms, the early proposals presented to the Congress that enacted
OSHA were ambiguous in status. In the Senate, the proposal sup-

ported by organized labor provided administratively-assessed "civil"
penalties for all substantive violations, but punished as a misdemeanor
all willful or other failures to comply with administrative abatement
orders accompanying such assessments.'

The first bill backed by the

White House contained a provision imposing "civil" penalties (of up to
$10,000) solely for each willful violation of its substantive requirements, within a section otherwise prescribing expressly criminal penalties.9 The bill reported and passed by the Senate imposed both "civil"

penalties of up to $1,000 for any violation of substantive, record-keeping or inspection provisions, and express criminal sanctions for willful
violations of those same provisions,' 0 and was explained by the Senate
Labor Committee as "mak[ing] it a misdemeanor to willfully violate
the requirements of the Act.""II
In the House, several proposals similarly provided both adminis-

tratively-assessed "civil" penalties for initial violations or failures to
abate and criminal misdemeanor penalties for "any person who will-

fully violates or fails or refuses to comply with any [administrative
abatement] order."' 2 Moreover, the version introduced by the chair-

man of the responsible committee contained "civil penalties" described
as forfeitures subject to executive clemency. 13 These proposals were
2nd Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 602-05, 7446, 16609, 18513-14 (1968) (Sen. Yarborough introducing the prime Johnson Administration precursor).
8. See S.2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) & (b) (1969), reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra
note 7, at 14-16. Section 9(a) provided civil penalties of up to $1,000 for each violation;
section 9(b) proposed that willful failure to comply with any order issued under the Act be
deemed a misdemeanor, punishable upon conviction by not more than a $5,000 fine and/or
imprisonment for not more than six months.
9. See S.2788, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(a)-(c) (1969), reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra
note 7, at 54-55. Sections 10(a) and (b) imposed criminal penalties for knowingly making
false statements, concealing material facts, and interfering with persons investigating possible violations, but not for substantive violations of the Act itself.
10. S.2193, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 14(a) & (c) (1970) (as amended), reprinted in LEG.
HIST., supra note 4, at 265-66; S.2193,91st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 15(a) & (c) (1970), reprintedin
LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 565-66.
11. S.REP. No. 91-1282,91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 (1970), reprintedin LEG. HIsT., supra
note 7 at 156.
12. See H.R. 843, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) & (b) (1969), reprintedin LEG. HIST.,
supra note 7, at 612-13; H.R. 3809, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) & (b) (1969), reprintedin
LEG. HIsT., supra note 7, at 642-43; H.R. 4294, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 9(a)-(c) (1969) [hereinafter cited as Perkins Bill], reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 667-68.
13. Perkins Bill, supranote 12, at § 9(a), reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 667.
In addition, the conspicuous omission of "willfully" before "fails" and "refuses" in all three
bills could arguably have been read as creating a complete overlap between the "civil" and
"criminal" nonabatement sanctions provided.
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eventually rejected in favor of the reported Daniels Bill14 and the
House-passed Steiger substitute,' 5 which provided only "civil" sanctions for all substantive violations. But that rejection did not resolve
the matter, for the House Labor Committee characterized those civil
sanctions in equivocal terms, suggesting that they were intended to effect the twin goals of retribution and deterrence normally associated
with punishment:
A national occupational safety and health program raises the
valid question of how great an emphasis shall be placed on seeking out employers who do no/follow safepractices. . . .No matter what priority is given to voluntary compliance, companies
which operate in a reckless manner should be dealt with firmly
... .American industry cannot be made safe and healthful
solely by enacting a Federal law which emphasizes punishment
enforcement
Nevertheless, this measure recognizes that effective
6
and sanctions are necessary for serious cases.'
Finally, Senator Dominick, whose own proposed substitute was identical to the Steiger Bill and failed passage by only two votes in the Senate, 7 stated explicitly that the motive for this choice of "civil" sanctions
was the difficulty of enforcing criminal penalties in these types of cases:
As noted above, under the provisions of the substitute, we have a
civil not a criminal penalty for a willful or repeated violation.
That has been treated with some care. We did it this way because. . . most of us know how difficult it is to get an enforceable criminal penalty in these types of cases. Over and over
again, the burden of proof under a criminal-type allegation is so
strong that you simply cannot get there, soyou might as well have
a civilpenalty insteadof the criminalpenaltyandget the8employer
by the pocketbook ifyou cannotget him anywhere else.'
This same motive was at least inferentially similar to that of the Joint
Conference Committee, which retained verbatim the language of the
House incorporating the Steiger-Dominick "civil" penalty structure,
coupled with a version of the Senate's provision imposing criminal
sanctions for willful violations of safety standards that cause fatalities
14. See H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 15(a)-(c) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dan-

iels Bill], reprintedin LEG. Hisr., supra note 7, at 744-46.
15. H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 17(a)-(d) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Steiger
Bill], reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra note 8 at 803-04. The Steiger Bill was adopted as an
amendment in the nature of a substitute to the reported bill. Id at 1091.
16. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1970) (report accompanying Daniels Bill, supra note 14), reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra note 7 at 856 (emphasis added).
17. 116 CONG. REc. 37347 (1970). For Senator Dominick's proposal, see S. 4404, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprintedinLEG. HIST., supra note 7, at 73-140. His proposal's exclusively civil sanctions for substantive violations may be found in sections 17(a)-(d) of his
substitute version. Id at 113-14.
18. 116 CONG. REC. 37338 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Dominick) (emphasis added).
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among employees. I9
The government .in subsequent cases cited Senator Dominick's
language and the enacted bill's distinction between civil "penalties"
and criminal "fines" 20 as conclusive evidence of the former category's
civil status."1 But this evidence was hardly conclusive. Indeed, Senator Dominick's rather candid admission could easily be interpreted as

expressing an intent to punish recalcitrant employers by a method that
would circumvent the inconvenient strictures of criminal process-an

intent supporting contentions that Congress was engaging in semantic
games when it adopted the "civil penalty" label.22 Nor was the issue

settled by the fact that the relevant provision of OSHA created distinct
classes of pecuniary sanctions, "civil penalties" and "frees.

' 23

While

the enactment of this provision evinced a legislative intent to demarcate
the two types of sanctions that the Secretary of Labor may employ, it
could not demonstrate per se that the former class of exactions was civil
while only the latter was criminal, particularly where the terms used to
24
designate those classes had been utilized ambiguously in the past.

Thus, a clash over the constitutional status of OSHA's money penalties
under "the winding, twisting, all too vague boundary between the crim-

inal and civil law" '25 implied in the Supreme Court's previous decisions
19. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 41 (1970) reprintedin LEG.
HIST., supra note 7, at 1171, 1194. See also id at 1203, 1210; 116 CONG. REc. 42201-42203
(1970) (remarks of Reps. Perkins & Daniels). At least one court has confirmed this possible
inference of punitive motive. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1205 n.12
(3d Cir. 1974) (citing Sen. Dominick's statement in a context apparently opposed to the
opinion's conclusion that the congressional intent to create civil sanctions was clear).
20. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), (h), (i), and (k) (1970) with id § 666(e)-(g).
21. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 22-29, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, No. 731765 (3d Cir. 1974). The same position was taken by the government in response to very
early actions seeking to enjoin Commission proceedings as repugnant to article three, section
two, clause three of the Constitution and to the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Brief in Support of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss at 16-19, Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, Civ. No.
16012 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 1972), complaint dismissed,343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), afld, 409
U.S. 1070 (1972).
22. See note 19 supra. Challengers to civil penalty provisions frequently claim that the
designation "civil" is a subterfuge and that they should be afforded the procedural safeguards required in criminal proceedings. See Goldschmid, An Evaluationofthe Presentand
Potential Use of Civil Money PenaltiesAs a Sanction by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES 896, 913 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldschmid].

23. See note 5 supra.
24. See, e.g., Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1355 & n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935);
Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-13
(1903).
25. Goldschmid, supra note 22, at 913.
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appeared inevitable.
H. When are "Civil" Sanctions Criminal in Effect?
This section analyzes

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,26 the

Supreme Court's major recent attempt to develop coherent guidelines
for distinguishing civil from criminal sanctions for constitutional purposes. After concluding that this attempt failed, the section then traces
the precedents Mendoza-Martinez sought to reconcile and demonstrates that those prior cases are themselves riddled with inconsistencies, which Mendoza-Martinez and its progeny have almost inevitably
come to reflect.27
A.

General Principles: The Mendoza-Martinez Case
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,2 8 the Court was faced with the

question of whether a statutory provision automatically expatriating
any citizen who left or remained outside the United States to evade
military service during time of war or national emergency 9 was invalid
because such a sanction was beyond Congress' power to impose. 30 The
Court avoided this question by focusing instead upon the civil-criminal
issue of whether the challenged enactment imposed a penal forfeiture
without according the appellees their procedural rights under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.31 It then held, five to four, that expatriation
as imposed by the statute in question was "evidently punitive."32 In so
26. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
27. See notes 67-159 and accompanying text infra.
28. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
29. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 401(j), 54 Stat. 1137 (added by Act of
Sept. 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-431, 58 Stat. 746), amendedby Immigration & Nationality Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (repealed by Act of Sept. 14,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258).
30. 372 U.S. at 146, 164-66. The argument that expatriation could not be invoked by
Congress rested both on the uniquely high status of citizenship under the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment and on a contention that, at least as applied to one appellee who
did not possess dual nationality and would therefore be left stateless, denationalization constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id at 160.
31. Id at 164. While the Court also adverted to a general due process right to a hearing, it seemed to base its holding mainly on the denial of the specific guarantees of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments requiring a prior criminal trial with all its attendant procedural
safeguards. This course was undoubtedly taken because administrative and judicial machinery was expressly made available to challenge expatriation determinations before any
actual deprivation was finally imposed. Id at 167. See, e.g., Perez v.Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 47 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 122-23 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. 372 U.S. at 168.
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ruling, the majority summarized "the tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory" as follows:
Whether the sanction [employed] involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry. . . . Absent conclusive evidence of congressionalintent as to the penal nature of a
must be consideredin relation to the statute on
statute,thesefactors
33
itsface.
The startling aspect of these tests was their open-ended nature,
both in content and in the way the majority in Mendoza-Martinez proceeded to disregard them. The Court admitted that the seven factors
listed "may often point in differing directions" 34 and that the classification issue "in other cases. . . has been extremely difficult and elusive
of solution,"3 5 but the difficulty was not merely one of elusiveness.
The precise dichotomy between statutes which are "penal" and those
which are "regulatory in character" was itself unclear, for use of criminal sanctions to implement regulatory programs whose aims were essentially prospective and beneficent was well-established. 36 Nor did
the factors listed by the majority really narrow the issue. Scienter was
notoriously subject to definition by virtue of the particular regulatory
scheme at hand 37 and had long lost mens rea connotations even for
express criminal sanctions.3 8 Moreover, the goals of retribution and de33. Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
34. Id at 169.
35. Id. at 168.
36. See, e.g., Sherman Act §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act § 303, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
37. Thus, as one commentator has pointed out, "knowledge" as a mens rea requirement
may have five possible meanings: (1) guilty knowledge arising from an awareness that is
derived from personal observation; (2) a correct guilty belief; (3) guilty avoidance of knowledge, le., either a guilty statement of knowledge by one who is aware of his ignorance, or a
guilty "shutting of the eyes" in order to avoid discovering relevant facts: (4) a bona fide but
erroneous belief resulting from criminal negligence; or (5) a bona fide but erroneous belief
based upon reasonable grounds or resulting from slight negligence. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 775-79 (2d ed. 1969). Which of these definitions of scienter will be applied to a
particular offense will turn on both the nature of that offense and its relative place in the
particular hierarchy of criminal offenses at hand.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-10 (1971); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943). Freed involved a challenge to an amended provision
of the National Firearms Act making it unlawful for one "to receive or possess a firearm

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

terrence are "not solely a value of the criminal law, but [have] long
played a role in civil law too (e.g, treble damages in antitrust and punitive damages in tort law)." 39 The same ambiguity existed with respect to the Court's affirmative-disability, historical, prior-crime, and
excessive-sanction factors. History and the nature of past criminal proscriptions are not helpful in classifying either newly-defined transgressions, which trigger novel sanctions, 4° or offenses invoking sanctions
like money penalties, which have been used indiscriminately for both
"penal" and "regulatory" purposes.41 And absent a penalty like impriswhich is not registered to him." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1970). The respondents in that case,
who were indicted as unregistered possessors of hand grenades, argued that the indictment
returned against them was invalid because it contained no allegation of scienter. The Court
noted that ordinary people would not be astonished to learn that possession of grenades is
unlawful, but it went on to say that even if the respondents had acted innocently, the statute
exemplified that class of legislation in which occasional hardships visited upon unsuspecting
individuals were justified by the countervailing benefits conferred upon the public at large.
Dotterweich involved a provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 that
punished as a misdemeanor the distribution in interstate commerce of adulterated or misbranded drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1938). Dotterweich, president of Buffalo Pharmacal Company, challenged his conviction under this provision on the ground that he had never known
that persons in his firm were committing the proscribed acts. The Court found this defense
irrelevant and upheld the conviction as a matter of law, citing the congressional purpose to
protect the innocent public despite the "[h]ardship there doubtless may' be under a statute
which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." 320 U.S. at 284.
One of the two cases cited by the majority in Mendoza-Martinez in support of its reference to the element of scienter, 372 U.S. at 168 n.24, only emphasizes that element's ambiguities. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903), involved a challenge to an additional
customs duty assessed against anyone who undervalued imported goods. The Court found
the duty to be penal, even though it could be imposed, absent a showing of scienter, "because of the carelessness, ignorance or mistake, without fraudulent intent, upon the part of
the importer." Id at 612. That finding would appear to contravert the very proposition
for which the case was cited in Mendoza-Martinez itself.
39. Goldschmid, supra note 22, at 914-15. See also id at 912.
40. It may well be doubted whether, for example, the violation of an anti-pollution
ordinance that results in the temporary governmental nationalization of the offending cornpay until abatement controls are in place, is criminal. Certainly the issue is not resolved by
invoking historical experience as a decision-making guideline. Justice Brennan alluded to
this potential difficulty when, concurring in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 8o, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring), he noted that: "The novelty of expatriation as punishment [in American
law] does not alone demonstrate its inefficiency. In recent years we have seen such devices
as indeterminate sentences and parole added to the traditional term of imprisonment."
41. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935): United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 611 (1903). The
mere fact that Congress has not already made the proscribed conduct a crime cannot control
whether a challenged sanction is penal. The contrary conclusion would free a legislature
from compliance with procedural restrictions mandated by the Constitution whenever it creates a new offense. But by the same token, it is difficult to see how the presence of parallel
criminal sanctions can resolve the issue of classification, which logically turns on the "nature" and "character" of the remedy at hand, Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. at 613, not
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onment or disqualification from gainful employment,4 2 the disabling or

disproportionate nature of a particular sanction seems equally unhelpful. All sanctions by definition impose some "affirmative disability
or restraint," and disproportionate severity is peculiarly in the eye of
the beholder.4 3
More importantly, the rational attribution test, 4 on which the case
might actually have turned, appeared to be an empty vessel that the

majority's opinion did not fill. Having stated that the seven factors
specified must be considered in relation to the statute on its face, the
Court immediately decided that it did not need to apply those factors in
the existence of a complementary sanction that has not been invoked. The Court has elsewhere acknowledged as much. In Helwig, it indicated that the presence of parallel criminal
sanctions will not confer "civil" status on a challenged remedy. Id. at 611-13. In Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), it further ruled that Congress could impose both penal and
nonpenal sanctions for the same act or omission. Id at 399. Indeed, in Mitchell the Court
went on to suggest that Congress may prescribe express criminal procedures for imposing a
sanction, without necessarily making that sanction punitive in effect. Id. at 402 n.6.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (disqualification from
governmental employment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236-37 (1896);
Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 350-52 (1886); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29
(1885) (all three cases involving the sanction of imprisonment at hard labor); ExparteGarland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (disqualification from practicing law in federal
courts); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320-21 (1867) (disqualification from
practicing one's duties as a priest).
43. This point was made forcefully by objections in Trop to the plurality's conclusion
that desertion punishable by execution could not be sanctioned by expatriation: "Congress
may justifiably be of the view that stem measures-what to some may seem overly
stem-are needed in order that control may be had over evasions of military duty. . . . Is
constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?" Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 121, 125 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
The subjective nature of "disproportionate severity" is further emphasized by juxtaposing two other decisions of the Supreme Court. In Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605
(1903), the Court had held disproportionate and penal an additional customs duty of two
percent for each percent the appraised (actual) value of imported articles exceeded their
declared value. The penalty assessed pursuant to this provision amounted to $9,068-fiftyfour percent of the underpaid items' actual value. Id at 610-11. Yet in Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), the Court held civil, remedial, and a fortiori not disproportionate, a flat fifty percent addition to an individual's income tax for "fraud with intent to
evade taxes," which had resulted in the assessment of a penalty of $364,000 against that
taxpayer. Id at 397-406.
44. "[W]hether an alternative purpose to which. . . [the sanction] may rationally be
connected is assignable for it. . . ." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963) (footnote omitted). This formulation seems closely related to the principle that legislative actions will, in general, be sustained against claims of unconstitutional arbitrariness,
where any rational connection between a legislative power, the evil sought to be remedied
and the remedy invoked can be attributed to the legislature, even if it never considered that
connection when the challenged statute was passed. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 10507 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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M4endoza-Martinez itself because "the objective manifestations of con-

gressional purpose indicate conclusively that the provisions in question
can only be interpreted as punitive."4 The Court then proceeded to
find the challenged sanction "plainly" or "primarily" penal 6 on the
basis of a detailed examination of that sanction's legislative antecedents, but barely referred to rational attribution, objective evidence of
congressional purpose or the text of the statutory provision at hand.
More specifically, the Court began its analysis with a detailed
scrutiny of the legislative debates underlying enactment of an 1865
law4 7 that was the challenged statute's predecessor, concluding that
both the sponsors and the opponents of this prior legislation deemed its
provisions punitive.4 8 In addition, the Court cited several decisions
construing this predecessor statute as penal in character.4 9 This 1865
law was amended in 1912,50 and again the Court focused on congressional statements that the proposed amendment would ameliorate some
of the more punitive aspects of the law.5 However, in assuming that
focus, the Court failed to acknowledge that proposed sanctions may be
described as "punitive" for the purposes of legislative debate without
any belief by the debaters that those sanctions are criminal per se.52 In
this consideration of predecessor legislation, the Court analyzed both
statements of legislative purpose and the language and structure of the
law itself, at least as interpreted judicially. However, when the majority in Mendoza-Martinez considered the actual legislation being questioned-section 4010) of the amended Immigration Act of 1940 and its
successor, section 349(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
195253, which represented a comprehensive replacement of prior provi45. 372 U.S. at 169.
46.

Id at 167, 169, 183.

47. Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 487.
48. 372 U.S. at 171-74 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 642 (1865) (remarks
of Sens. Morrill and Johnson); id at 643 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks); id at 1155-56 (remarks of Reps. Allen and Schenck)).
49. 372 U.S. at 174-76 (quoting Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 501-02 (1885); Huber v.
Reily, 53 Pa. 112, 114-15 (1866)).
50. Act of August 22, 1912, 37 Stat. 356.

51. 372 U.S. at 177-78 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 335, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912); 48
CONG. REC. 2903 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Roberts); id at 9542 (remarks of Sen. Bristow)).
52. See, e.g., Frank Irey, Jr. Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1204 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd
without considering the point, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert denied on the
point, 424 U.S. 964 (1976). This is especially true where the "penal" label is applied by
those attempting to mitigate the severity of such provisions. See, e.g., S. REP. No.91-1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61-64 (1970), reprintedin LEG. HIST. supra note 7, at 200-03; H.R. REP.
No.91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47-60 (1970), reprintedin LEG. HIsT., supra note 7, at 87790.
53. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 401(j), 54 Stat. 1137 (added by Act of
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sions, not a mere amendment-it took into account only two varieties
of evidence: legislative debates and a letter from the Attorney General
purportedly explaining the purpose of the provision that became sec-

tion 401(j). 54 It also noted that unlike its predecessors, section 4010)
afforded no hearing prior to the imposition of sanctions, ignoring the
possible inference that for this very reason Congress did not consider
those sanctions to be criminal." The Court concluded that because

this evidence "brought to light no alternative purpose to differentiate
the new statute from its predecessor," the challenged provisions must
be struck down.56

Thus, the Court's conclusion regarding the issue of punishment
was premised on the observation that Congress had not in fact mentioned an alternate non-punitive purpose, rather than whether one
could rationally be assigned to the sanction in question. 7 Despite em-

phatic prior pronouncements that congressional intent could not be dispositive and that "even a clear legislative classification.

. .

as 'non-

penal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute,"5 8 the majority's analysis suggested, as did that of the dissent,5 9

that the controlling test for distinguishing "punishment" from "regulation" was the underlying, subjective purpose of the legislature enacting
the challenged law. This analysis indicated neither what result would

follow nor what presumptions might be relied upon where relevant legSept. 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-431, 58 Stat. 746), amendedby Immigration & Nationality Act
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (repealed by Act of Sept. 14,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258).
54. 372 U.S. at 180-83 (citing H.R. REp. No. 1229, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1944) (text
of Attorney General's letter); 90 CONG. REc. 3261 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Dickstein); id. at
7629 (remarks of Sen. Russell)).
55. 372 U.S. at 179. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 402 (1938), in
which the Court actually appeared to draw such an inference.
56. 372 U.S. at 183-84.
57. Id at 169-184, 186 n.43. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion appeared to make a
deliberate attempt to remedy this perceived gap in the majority's analysis. Noting that because "Congress was not consciously pursuing any foreign affairs [or war power] objective
may not necessarily preclude reliance on that power as a ground of constitutionality," id at
193 (Brennan, J., concurring), he marshalled a series of powerful arguments meant to
demonstrate that no purpose other than a desire to impose "naked vengeance" on wartime
deserters could possibly be attributed to this statute. Id at 187-97. As the dissent indicated, however, these arguments tended to prove too much, for they suggested that denationalization was inherently penal. Id at 201-04, 208-10, 212-14 (Stewart, J., dissenting). They
certainly did not answer the question of what result would follow where rational alternative
attributions were less conclusively foreclosed and the challenged sanction was not "the drastic, the truly terrifying remedy of expatriation." Id at 187 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (footnote omitted).
59. 372 U.S. at 203-204, 208-209.
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islative history was non-existent or intractably ambiguous.60 Finally,
the Court in Mendoza-Mardinez made no effort to explain the relationships among legislative intent, textual statutory evidence, and the
Court's own powers in this delicate area. Where the indicia of punitive
intent are "overwhelming"'" and the sanction is not part of a fimelybalanced regulatory scheme, it is not particularly disruptive to take the
legislature at its word and require that the sanction be imposed through
criminal process. But what if Congress assumes that swift, easily-imposed civil sanctions are necessary and bases an entire statutory scheme
of regulation upon that assumption?
These difficulties might be dismissed as anomalies resulting from
the Court's casual response to an easy case, both because draft evasion
was already subject to separate, severe criminal penalties and because
Congress evinced an apparent intent to use denationalization as an alternate means of punishing those who were beyond American jurisdiction and could not be prosecuted.62 But the Court did not treat the
case casually. Nor did its discussion of the merits appear to rely on the
had
fact that draft evasion was already a crime, although the 6Court
3
been compelled to deal with this fact as a threshold matter.
In sum, Mendoza-Martineznot only raises more questions than it
resolves, but also presents a classic example of the difficulties inherent
in attempts at civil-criminal classification. The Court first articulated
60. The dissent would have presumed the questioned statutory sanctions to be civil,
absent clear proof "in the history of this legislation . . . that these statutes, though not in
terms penal, nonetheless embody a purpose of the Congresses which enacted them to impose
criminal punishment without the safeguards of a criminal trial." 372 U.S. at 204 (Stewart,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
61. 372 U.S. at 170 n.30.
62. See id at 147, 150-51, 155-58, 180-84 (majority opinion); id at 190-91 & n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. See id at 155-58, 164, 166-67 (majority opinion); id at 190-91 & n.5 (Brennan, I.,
concurring). The majority did bracket its analysis of the merits with observations that the
challenged sanction's "primary function is to serve as an additional penalty for a special
category of draft evader," Id at 169-70 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted), and that
"Congress in these sections decreed an additional punishment for the crime of draft avoidance in the special category of cases wherein the evader leaves the country." Id at 184.
But the sanction at issue was an alternative,substitute measure chiefly meant to reach draft
evaders who could not be prosecuted, rather than an additional punishment for those who
could. Id at 183. If its vice was the overbreadth inherent in the possibility that it might be
used to denationalize some citizens who had already been prosecuted for the separate crime
of draft evasion, then that vice could presumably be cured by limiting its application solely
to those not subject to such prosecution. But this curative interpretation was foreclosed by
the facts of the case itself. Mendoza-Martinez, one of the appellees, had been previously
convicted of draft evasion; yet the Court rejected his initial defense that the government was
estopped by his prior conviction from invoking the sanction of denationalization. Id at
155-58.
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seven discrete tests for determining whether a sanction is "civil" or
"criminal" in effect, several of which possessed doubtful analytical relevance. It admitted that these tests would often point in differing directions, but made no effort either to explain how they might interact
with each other or to indicate the relative weights accorded to each of
them in the event of conflict. Instead, the Court announced that this
set of "objective" criteria need not be applied at all because the legislative history underlying the challenged provisions conclusively disclosed
a subjective congressional intent to punish. However, even the legislative record in Mendoza-Martinezwas not conclusively clear. This contention was tacitly supported by the majority opinion itself, which
progressed swiftly from the opening statement that "the provisions in
question can only be interpreted as punitive"' to more cautious assertions that those provisions were primarily or predominantly penal in
character.6 5 That progression implied-as did the single-minded tenor
of the majority's scrutiny of subjective legislative intent-that a different result might have been reached had the Court attempted to impute
a rational nonpenal purpose to the statute before it. The majority's
approach also implied that an entirely different method of analysis
might have been required if one legislator had chanced to express a
clear belief that the challenged sanctions were "civil" in nature. Such
implications in turn raised the troubling possibility that the Court's
analysis was fundamentally unprincipled-that penal sanctions were,
like Justice Stewart's defimition of hard-core pornography, something
recognized only when seen.66

B. Some Antecedents and Descendants of Mendoza-Martinez
. Early Developments: From Helwig to Constantine
In fact, many of the cases cited by the Court in Mendoza-Martinez
in support of its seven factors disclose deeper divisions that have not
yet been resolved. In Helwig v. United States,67 the Court was confronted with a statute68 that levied both a ten percent ad valorem duty
on the declared value of imported articles and a "further sum" of two
percent of the appraised value of such articles for each one percent that
such an appraisal exceeded the declared amount; where appraised
value exceeded declared value by forty percent or more, a flat forfei64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id at 169 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See id at 169-70, 183.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
188 U.S. 605 (1903).
Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 7, 26 Stat. 131, 134.
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ture of the articles in question was imposed.69 Helwig declared the
value of a quantity of imported wood pulp at $13,252 and paid as a
duty ten percent of this amount. A customs appraiser subsequently
valued the pulp at $16,792.20. Helwig thereupon paid the government
$354 ad valorem based on the increased appraisal. However, the government also claimed and sought to recover the "further sum" of
$9,068-over half the imported pulp's appraised value 7°--resulting
from this act of undervaluation. Helwig claimed that this extra assessment was not a tax, but a penalty and that the relevant court lacked
statutory jurisdiction to impose it.7'
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with these claims, in an
opinion that utilized both "subjective" and "objective" approaches to
classification without indicating which approach would control. The
Court first stated that the additional duty in question was a penalty
because it was triggered by the importer's act rather than the value of
his goods and because it was "enormously in excess of the [ten percent]
72
regular duty . . . imposed upon an article of the same nature.
These statements ignored the point that all regulator) sanctions necessarily turn on the act sought to be regulated. Nor did the Court clarify
the relevance of disproportionate severity or enormous excessiveness.
Since Helwig had already paid in full the ten percent duty on the appraised value of his wood pulp, any additional assessment would appear equally disproportionate, if the governing test was whether that
assessment "is . . .imposed for

. . .

purpose[s] of revenue, [or] is in

addition to the duties [normally] imposed. '73 Instead, the Court's conclusions appeared to be premised on a belief that the challenged exaction was intrinsically penal-that the "use of [civil] words does not
change the nature and character of the enactment," the sanction for
which "will be regarded as a penalty when by its very nature it is a
penalty."74 Yet at the same time, the Court indicated that the intrinsic
nature of the sanction might not be controlling, for "[i]f it clearly appear.

. .

the will of Congress that the provision shall not be regarded

as in the nature of a penalty, the Court must be governed by that
69. 188 U.S. at 609 n.l. The "further sum" was imposed only where the appraised
value exceeded the declared value by over ten percent. However, once this provision was
triggered, the amount assessed was calculated on the basis of the entire percentage of excess
appraised value, not merely the portion exceeding ten percent. Id at 607, 611.
70. For a recital of the facts of the case, see id at 606-08.
71. See id at 610.
72. Id at 613.
73. Id at 611.
74. Id at 613.
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75

These conflicting statements might have been reconciled by making the intrinsic character of the challenged sanction dispositive, absent
express legislative declarations of a contrary intent. But apart from the
Court's failure to present meaningful criteria by which the intrinsic nature of a sanction could be determined, it advanced no logical reason
demonstrating why legislative intent should control. If the inherent
character of the questioned sanction possessed independent weight, exactly the opposite would seem to be the case. Thus, the holding of the
Court seemed not only to confirm that Congress could evade the strictures of the Sixth Amendment by fiat, but also to invite decisions based
on the fortuitous degree of explicitness with which a legislature expressed, or failed to express, its specific desires. This impression was
strengthened by the Court's disregard of clear indications of nonpenal
congressional intent in favor of advisory opinions of the Attorney General and judicial dicta construing the challenged provision and its predecessors as penal for very different purposes.7 6 Even more
disturbingly, the Court in Helwig ignored the fact that Congress had
not only used expressly civil terms to describe the "additional duty"
being exacted, but had also used the same terms to describe the flat
forfeiture imposed on undervaluations of forty percent, and had provided the same civil collection process for both.7 7 Congress had also
legislated a presumption of fraud in order to justify these forfeitures-a
presumption that seemed incompatible with any inference of penal intent.7 8 All these elements undermined the Court's reasoning, which
relied on the assumption that such forfeitures were penal for its conclu75. Id
76. Id at 616-19 (citing Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221 (1892); Stairs v.
Peaslee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 521, 527 (1855); Ring v. Maxwell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 147, 150
(1854); Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263, 274 (1853); Greely v. Thompson, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 225, 238 (1850); 20 Op. ATr'Y GuN. 660 (1893)). The authorities cited had construed
analogous provisions in previous tariff acts. See Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 32, 30 Stat.
151, 212; Act of July 30, 1846, ch. 74, § 7, 9 Stat. 42, 43; Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 17, 5
Stat. 548, 564. The most persuasive indication cited by the Court was the 1897 Act, which
"plainly directed that the additional duty. . . shall not be construed as a penalty." 188
U.S. at 616. Despite the fact that Congress had deliberately changed this provision's predecessor from a "penalty" to a "duty" some seventy years before, Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55,
§ 9, 4 Stat. 270, 274, and had since re-enacted that change, the Court dismissed this "mere
description" as "evidently not regarded as of vital importance." 188 U.S. at 614-15.
77. 188 U.S. at 609-10 & n.l.
78. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696-701 (1975); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 359-63 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); Nishikawa v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 133-37 (1958); Cofftm v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452-61 (1895).
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sion that the lesser two percent duty possessed the same character.7 9
Such elements suggested that despite its logical apparatus and apparent
willingness to defer to congressional intent, the Court's opinion actually turned on unstated criteria of fairness, on the inchoate equities underscored by the petitioner's act of innocent undervaluation.
This suggestion was reinforced by subsequent cases holding other
taxes inherently punitive without any regard for the expressed intent of
the legislature. In ]4pke v. Ledere 0 the Court, despite an apparent
lack of equity jurisdiction, 8 1 invalidated section thirty-five of the National Prohibition Act, which assessed against the illegal manufacturers
or sellers of liquor (a) a "tax" equal to double the amount imposed
against the receipts of those distributing liquor lawfully and (b) an "additional penalty" of $500 on retail dealers and $1,000 on manufacturers. 82 Both the receipt tax and the additional penalty were expressly
distinguished from the Act's criminal sanctions, and civil tax process
was prescribed for their collection.83 But in Lopke, imposition of the
challenged sanctions had resulted in an impending property seizure
against a retailer whose state liquor license had not yet expired. The
Court simply cited Helwig, stating:
The mere use of the word "tax" in an act primarily designed to
define and suppress crime is not enough to show that within the
true intendment of the term a tax was laid. . . . When by its
very nature the imposition is a penalty, it must be so regarded.
Helwig v. United States. . . . Evidence of crime. . . is essential
to assessment under § 35. It lacks all the ordinary characteristics
of a tax, whose primary function "is to provide for the support of
for
the government" and clearly involves the idea of punishment
84
infraction of the law-the definite function of a penalty.
In United States v. La Franca5 the Court was asked to determine
79. 188 U.S. at 612.
80. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
81. See id at 563-65 (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Pitney, J.). Justice Brandeis
argued that the petitioner had numerous adequate remedies at law, including an action to
recover the amount paid to the tax collector, a suit for trespass incident to wrongful distraint,
or a possible action of replevin. Consequently, he concluded, "[w]hether the government's
demand be deemed one for a fine or for a tax which is unconstitutional, legal remedies are
available; and there is, therefore, lack of jurisdiction in equity." Id at 564-65.
82. 41 Stat. 305, 317-318, 27 U.S.C. § 52 (1928) (repealed 1933). The terms of this section specified both that "[t]his Act shall not relieve anyone from paying any taxes or other
such charges imposed upon the manufacture or traffic in

. .

. liquor" and that "this Act

[shall not] relieve any person from any liability, civil or criminal, heretofore or hereafter
incurred under existing laws."
83. See 259 U.S. at 560-61.
84. Id at 561-62 (quoting O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914)).
85. 282 U.S. 568 (1931).
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the status of another federal liquor tax, which appeared in the Revenue
Code, rather than a regulatory statute. Section five of the Federal Willis-Campbell Act86 preserved parallel state legislation from implicit repeal by the National Prohibition Act, but provided that conviction
under one set of laws would bar subsequent "prosecution" for the same
offense under the other. Pursuant to section 701 of the Revenue Act of
1924,87 anyone retailing liquor in violation of state law was assessed
$1,000 in addition to all other taxes. The respondent challenged assessments made under both this section and the section involved in
L6pke, claiming that the government's civil suit for collection of these
sums was precluded because he had previously been convicted and
88
fined under the criminal provisions of the National Prohibition Act.
Neither the fact that section 701 appeared in a revenue statute originally enacted prior to Prohibition, 9 nor the fact that the section was
enforced through civil process, nor the fact that it was admittedly awkward to apply the term "prosecution" as used in the Willis-Campbell
Act to this civil suit for collection,9" deterred the Court from stating
mechanically:
A "tax" is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of
government; a "penalty". . . is an exaction imposed by statute as
punishment for an unlawful act. The two words are not interchangeable, one for the other. No mere exercise of the art of
lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing;
and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into
a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such. That the exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a penalty involving the
idea of punishment for infraction of the law is settled by L£pke
91

The Court then proceeded, spurred by apparently unfounded fears of
double jeopardy complications, to find the challenged suit for collection barred because that suit was "in its nature" a criminal
86. 42 Stat. 222, 223, 27 U.S.C. § 3 (1928) (repealed 1935).
87. Int. Rev. Code of 1924, ch. 234, § 701, 43 Stat. 253, 327.
88. See 282 U.S. at 570.
89. See id at 571-72: "[Section 701] was passed in lieu of a similar provision in the
Revenue Act of 1918, repeated in the Revenue Act of 1921. The government, accordingly,
treats the item sought to be recovered under § 701 as having been imposed by an act in force
prior to the National Prohibition Act. With that view we agree."
90. See id at 575:
But an action to recover a penalty for an act declared to be a crime is, in its nature,
a punitive proceeding, although it take the form of a civil action; and the word
"prosecution" is not inapt to describe such an action. .. . In any event, we should
feel bound to resolve a greater doubt than we now entertain in favor of that interpretation of the word so as to avoid the grave constitutional question which otherwise would arise.
91. Id at 572.
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prosecution.92
A similar approach focusing on the inherent nature of the sanction
was taken in UnitedStates v. Constantine.93 That case involved a challenge to section 701 of the Revenue Act of 1926, 94 which levied a "spe-

cial excise tax" of $1,000 on manufacturers or sellers of liquor in
violation of state law. The same section also imposed an expresslydifferentiated "penalty" of $1,000, or one year in prison or both, upon
anyone failing to pay "special taxes" exacted by section 205 of Title
twenty-six of the United States Code.95 The Court noted that under
the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress could have sanctioned violations

of national prohibition laws by either taxes or penalties.96 But with the
repeal of the Amendment, it became necessary to consider whether the
$1,000 "excise tax" of section 701 was in fact penal. The majority in

Constantinestated summarily that while the smaller "special" taxes of
section 205 were "true taxes" rather than penalties. the tax imposed
under section 701 was levied on the commission of a crime under state
law.97 But it focused primarily on the purported exorbitancy of the
sum assessed, concluding that because $1,000 was forty times the "spe-

cial tax" of twenty-five dollars paid by a retail dealer like the respondent,98 "this additional sum is grossly disproportionate to the amount
of the normal tax. . . [and therefore its] purpose is to impose a penalty

as a deterrent and punishment of unlawful conduct." 99 This conclu-

sion was reached despite the fact that, as the government pointed out,
the substance of section 701 was passed long before the enactment of

the Eighteenth Amendment and abrogated well after that Amendment's repeal, a consideration that appeared to refute any inference
that the section was intended to enforce national prohibition.co It was
92. See id at 573-75. Even where both offenses are committed against the same sovereign, no claim of double jeopardy arises unless both are criminal as well. Cf., e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); see notes 105-122 and accompanying text infra. To
avoid this issue of classification on the grounds that "grave constitutional problems" may
arise, is to avoid determining the essential prerequisite for those problems' presence.
93. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
94. Int. Rev. Code of 1926, ch. 27, § 701, 44 Stat. 9, 95.
95. 26 U.S.C. § 205 (1926) (repealed 1935). This section imposed special annual taxes
as follows, without regard to the local lawfulness of the occupations taxed: $100 for brewers,
$50 for manufacturers of stills, $20 for each still, $25 for retail dealers in liquors, $100 for
wholesale dealers in liquors, $20 for retail dealers in malt liquors and $50 for wholesale
dealers in malt liquors.
96. 296 U.S. at 292-93.
97. Id at 291 & n.5, 295.
98. See note 95 supra.
99. 296 U.S. at 294-95.
100. As the government observed, the substance of section 701 was enacted on Feb. 28,
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also reached despite the fact that, as the dissent observed, the assessment exacted by section 701 possessed neither a necessary connection

with state penal aims nor any disproportion when considered in light of
other rational taxing purposes attributable to Congress. 10 '
Thus, Lipke, La Francaand Constantine eschewed any reliance on

either objective or subjective evidence of congressional intent, rejecting
as irrelevant not only contentions that the civil-criminal classification
issue was one of statutory construction,"0 2 but also contentions that the
legislative history of the challenged taxes disclosed a nonpunitive purpose.10 3 Instead, all three rulings rested on the inherently penal nature
of the assessment being questioned, without articulating satisfactory
criteria for determining such inherent nature. Each decision seemed
ultimately to turn on an essentially semantic distinction between laws
designed to deter certain behavior and those designed merely to raise
revenue. If the aim or effect of a purported tax was any regulation of
conduct, it would apparently be deemed punitive and beyond the
1919, Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 1001(12), 1005, 40 Stat. 1057, 1128, 1129 (1919), while
the Eighteenth Amendment was proclaimed on January 9, 1919, effective January 9, 1920.
Section one of the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment,
was ratified on December 5, 1933, while the substance of section 701 was not repealed until
1935. Act of Aug. 30, 1935, ch. 829, 49 Stat. 1014. See 296 U.S. at 291.
101. The majority's precise conclusion was that "in the present instance, under the guise
of a taxing act the purpose is to usurp the police powers of the State." 296 U.S. at 296
(footnote omitted). Justice Cardozo's dissent rested prophetically on a theory of "objective"
rational attribution in arguing that multiple non-penal purposes could be inferred from the
face of the statute:
Congress may reasonably have believed that, in view of the attendant risks, a business carried on illegally.

.

is likely to yield larger profits. .

.

. Not repression,

but payment commensurate with the gains is thus the animating motive. . . . Congress may have also believed that the furtive character of the business would increase the difficulty and expense of. . . tax collection. The Treasury should have
reimbursement for this dram on its resources. Apart from either of these beliefs,
Congress may have held the view that an excise should be so distributed as to work
a minimum of hardship.

.

. [by requiring] men engaged in such a calling.

. .

to

contribute more heavily to the necessities of the Treasury than men engaged in a
calling that is beneficent and lawful.
Id at 297 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Cardozo argued that the face of the statute indicated that it was adopted
as an appropriate instrument of the fiscal policy of the nation. . . . Classification
by Congress according to the nature of the calling affected by a tax. . . does not
cease to be permissible because the line . . . between callings to be favored and
those to be reproved corresponds with a division between innocence and criminality
under the
of a state. . . . By classifying in such a mode Congress is not
punishing
for statutes
a crime against another government. It is not punishing at all. It is
laying an excise upon a business. . . with notice to the taxpayer that if he embarks
upon that business he will be subjected to a special burden. What he pays, if he
chooses to go on, is a tax and not a penalty.
Id at 297-98.
102. See, eg., Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1935).
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pale.'04
2. The Mitchell andMarcus Cases
This trend was reversed abruptly in Helvering v. Mitchell,l 5 which
sustained a similar tax by implicit reliance on an axiom that sanctions
are civil when Congress says they are. Under section 146(b) of the
Revenue Act of 1928, a fine or imprisonment plus recovery of the costs
of prosecution could be imposed for willful "attempts. . .to evade or
defeat" payments of income tax10 6; under section 293(b) of the same
statute, an "addition to the tax" of fifty percent of the amount owed the
government could be assessed civilly against a deficient taxpayer "[i]f
any part of any deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax."' 1 7
Mitchell had been indicted under section 146(b) for underreporting his
income taxes by over $700,000; he was tried and acquitted. Pursuant
to section 293(b), the government then sought to assess against him
both this sum and an additional fifty percent amounting to $364,354.
Mitchell claimed the latter assessment was barred by the doctrine of
double jeopardy because it was "not a tax, but a criminal penalty intended as punishment for. . . fraudulent acts."' 1 8 Indeed, in light of
prior holdings, the additional assessment seemed clearly penal, for it
was plainly meant to deter specified conduct, involved proportionately
large amounts10 9 and was levied for tax fraud effectively identical to
the willful tax evasion that was criminally proscribed by section 146(b).
The Court nevertheless managed to rely on these ostensibly penal
aspects to justify its holding that section 293(b) exacted a civil sanction.
It began by disposing of any notion that a tax was intrinsically criminal
because it was imposed to compel desired behavior, stating that the
question was "one of statutory construction" because Congress was free
to inflict either criminal or civil sanctions "[t]o ensure full and honest
104. See also Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20
(1922), in which the Court invalidated as "penal" a federal excise tax of ten percent of the
net profits imposed upon any business operated by anyone who knowingly employed child
labor. The unsatisfactory nature of relying on the behavioral effects of a tax in order to
support a conclusion of penality was amply demonstrated by the Court's difficulty in distinguishing other cases sustaining similar taxes having equal or greater effects on human behavior. See id at 40-43.
105. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
106. Int. Rev. Code of 1928, ch. 852, § 146(b), 45 Stat. 835.
107. Id § 293(b), 45 Stat. 858.
108. 303 U.S. at 398.
109. This was especially apparent because fifty percent of the entire deficiency could be
assessed under section 293(b), even if only one dollar of that deficiency was attributable to
fraud on the part of the taxpayer.
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disclosure [and] discourage fraudulent attempts to evade the tax."' 10 It
then advanced several reasons for its finding that the flat fifty percent
"addition to the tax" was civil in nature. First, said the Court, a sanction may be remedial and "characteristically free of the punitive crimiSuch remedial
nal element" despite its comparative severity."'
sanctions included "[florfeiture of goods. . . and the payment of fixed
or variable sums of money. . which have [long] been recognized as
enforcible by civil proceedings." ' 1 2 Second, the sanctions imposed by
section 293(b) could be inferred to fall within this remedial category,
since they "are provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of
the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of3
investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud.""1
Third, Congress had provided a distinctly civil procedure for collecting
both the tax due and the fifty percent addition, a procedure which
would be unconstitutional if punishment were contemplated and which
was said to indicate clearly the legislature's intent to create a civil
rather than a criminal sanction. 1' 4 Finally, Congress had enacted two
separate and distinct provisions imposing sanctions, one labelled "penalties" and prescribing criminal fines or imprisonment,' '5 the other
composed of "additions to the tax" that were "[o]bviously all. . . intended . . ' as civil incidents of the assessment and collection of the
income tax." 16
The problem with these justifications was that, taken separately or
together, they afforded no firmer support for the Court's conclusion
that the challenged sanction was nonpenal than those stated in prior
decisions that had supported a contrary result. To assert that a sanction is inherently remedial rather than inherently criminal scarcely advances analysis where no criteria defining the former classification are
announced. Indeed, that approach makes reference to specific congressional intent irrelevant, as the Court itself tacitly admitted when it
remarked that the "fact that a criminal procedure is prescribed for the
enforcement of a sanction may be an indication that it is intended to be
punitive, but cannot be deemed conclusive if alternative enforcement by
a civil proceeding is sustained."1 '' If specific congressional intent
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

303 U.S. at 399.
Id at 399-400 & n.3.
Id at 400.
Id at 401 (footnote omitted).
Id at 402.
Id
Id at 404-05 (footnote omitted).
Id at 402 n.6 (emphasis added). This language implied that certain sanctions
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were relevant, as the Court's reliance on statutory construction might
suggest, it was difficult to understand how the civil enforceability of
forfeitures and payments enacted in other contexts would be useful in
resolving the issue. Moreover, it was simply inaccurate to imply that
the inherently civil character of tax forfeitures and additions was settled, as Lipke and Helwig demonstrated.
These difficulties might have been cured by the Court's imputation of revenue-protecting and compensatory motives to Congress in
order to support its remedial classification. But the Court did not explain why the fifty percent addition for fraud exacted by section 293(b)
was any more "compensatory" than the very similar sanction imposed
on innocent conduct in Helwig, a decision that had been cited repeatedly by Mitchell' 8 and that should have governed his case. The same
revenue-protecting function could well have been served by criminal
sanctions of far less severity; and since Mitchell had already been
found liable for the entire tax deficiency119 and remained fully liable
for interest thereon, the compensatory aspect of the $364,000 addition
was not apparent. In fact it was unclear why even compensation "for
the heavy expense of investigation" 2 ' was involved, since the cost of
investigating a $2,000 fraud that would trigger a $1,000 addition might
easily have equalled the cost of investigating the $700,000 fraud at
bar.'21 Finally, a similar logical flaw undermined the Court's reliance
on the fact that Congress had expressly distinguished this tax from parallel criminal sanctions and prescribed civil process to collect it. Lopke,
La Franca and Constantine had invalidated smaller assessments that
had also been similarly differentiated, indicating that one important
test for determining the character of a sanction is "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime."' 22 While it was true that
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to
the same act or omission,"1 23 the mere fact that two sanctions were enacted could not establish that only one of those exactions was penal.
might always be deemed civil, despite clear evidence of punitive congressional intent and
the enactment of criminal enforcement procedures confirming that intent.
118. Id at 392-94 (summary of brief for respondent).
119. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 873, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1937).
120. 303 U.S. at 401.
121. Indeed, Congress had expressly authorized the government to recover the costs of a
successful criminal prosecution for willful tax evasion under section 146(b). See note 106
supra. The lack of similar language in section 293(b) suggests as a matter of statutory
construction that the legislators had entertained no compensatory motive with respect to that
provision.
122. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 & n.26 (1963).
123. 303 U.S. at 399.
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Thus, Mitchell begged both the question of when sanctions that Congress labels as civil are criminal in effect, and the larger question of
whether there exist any principled constitutional limits on the legislative power to sanction. If Congress could punish criminal conduct simply by creating two sanctions and denominating one of them as civil,
the protections of the Sixth Amendment would be minimal indeed.
This bleak prospect seemed confirmed by United States ex rel
Marcus v. Hess,' 4 which reduced Mitchell's reliance on remedial compensation and congressional labels to a talismanic formula. Marcus
involved a challenge to sections 231 through 234 of Title thirty-one and
sections 80 through 83 of Title eighteen of the United States Code.' 2 5
Under those provisions: (a) anyone attempting to defraud the government could be punished by a fine and a prison term and (b) anyone
committing such fraudulent acts would "forfeit and pay to the United
States the sum of two thousand dollars, and in addition, double the
26
amount of damages. . . sustained. . . together with costs of suit.'
This forfeiture could be enforced either by the government suing on its
own behalf or by a qui tam action brought by a private person suing on
behalf of the government and dividing equally any recovery. 127 Like
Mitchell, the respondents in Marcus, electrical contractors accused of
engaging in collusive bidding on federal public works projects, had
been criminally indicted. 128 Unlike Mitchell, they pleaded nolo
contendere and were fimed $54,000. 129 Subsequently, a qui tam action
was brought against them to recover for the same fraudulent acts.
When that action produced an additional judgment of $315,000, including $112,000 in forfeitures-more than twice the criminal
free-they also argued that the double jeopardy doctrine barred its enforcement. The Court disagreed, making no effort to analyze either
the motives of Congress as expressed on the face of the statute for imposing this heavy additional sanction, or the actual motives that might
have produced it. Instead, the Court stated that the "forfeit and pay"
124. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
125. Rev. Stat. §§ 3490-3493, 5438 (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-234 (1940); 18
U.S.C. §§ 80-83 (1940)).
126. Rev. Stat. § 3490 (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1940)).
127. A qui tam action is one brought by a common informer whose only interest in the
controversy is statutory. See 317 U.S. at 540-41 & n.4.
128. Id at 539-40.
129. See id at 545. The criminal prosecution had been brought under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 88 (1940) (now codifledat 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976)), rather
than the challenged enactment's express criminal provisions. The Court correctly deemed
this fact unimportant. 317 U.S. at 548.
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provision simply afforded the government full restitution.'30 The fact
that the provision seemed guaranteed to yield more than the amount of
actual damages suffered, especially where it was invoked by the gov-

ernment rather than a private party, was abruptly dismissed:
As to the double damage provision, it cannot be said that there is
any recovery in excess of actual loss for the government, since in
the nature of the qui tam action the government's half of the
double damages is the amount of actual damages proved. But in
any case, Congress might have provided as it did in the anti-trust
laws for recovery of "threefold damages . . . sustained and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. §
15. Congress could remain fully in the common law tradition
and still provide punitive damages.131

With respect to the penal or remedial intent of Congress, the Court
simply asserted:
It is enough for present purposes if we conclude that the instant
proceedings are remedial and impose a civil sanction. The statutes on which this suit rests make elaborate provision both for a
criminal punishment and a civil remedy. . . .We cannot say that
the remedy now before us requiring payment of a lump sum and
double damages will do more than afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done it. Helveriz v. Mitchell
132

130. 317 U.S. at 551-52.
131. Id at 550 (footnote omitted).
132. Id at 549. This result was sufficiently problematic with respect to the provision for
double damages, but did not begin to deal with the problems raised b3 the forfeitures levied.
As to those, the Court merely remarked that even higher levels of damages could have been
imposed by Congress, quoting from Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899), to the effect
that punishment may arise from the application of a statute so far as the wrongdoer is concerned, "but this is not enough to label it as a criminal statute." 317 U.S. at 551. This
remark resembled contentions that because Congress may impose capital punishment, it
may permissibly employ the lesser sanctions of branding and thumbscrews. It suffered
from the same analytical defect of depriving constitutional limitations of content. See also
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 189-90 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
Justice Frankfurter in Marcus was sufficiently distressed by these "dialectical stlbtleties" to propose a test which would have completely removed civil-criminal considerations
from the double jeopardy sphere:
Punitive ends may be pursued in civil proceedings, and, conversely, the criminal
process is frequently employed to attain remedial rather than punitive ends....
The protection agamst twice being punished for the same offense should
hardly be made to depend upon the necessarily speculative judgment of a court
whether a "forfeiture' and "double the amount of damages i ich the United
States may have sustained" constitutes an extra penalty, or merely an indemnity
for loss suffered. If that is the issue on which the protection against doublejeopardy
turns, those who invoke the Constitution... ought to be allowed to prove that, as a
matter offact, theforfeture andthe double damages arepunitive because they exceed
any amount that could reasonably be regardedas the equivalent o compensationfor
the Government's loss. That in civil actions punitive damages are, as a matter of
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This conclusion ignored the fact that the criminalfines imposed on respondents, unlike those prescribed in Mitchell, also seemed at least

partly calculated to afford indemnification.133 That conclusion suggested nothing less than an axiom that Congress' classification would
be totally dispositive, notwithstanding the actual legislative intent underlying a sanction or the irrationality of compensatory motives judicially inferred to sustain it.134
due process, sometimes allowed... or that there may be distinct penal and remedial provisions for the same wrong ... does not help solve our present
problem....
317 U.S. at 554-55 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). However, the solution
actually proposed by Justice Frankfurter was to treat the "forfeit and pay" language of section 231 as an integral part of a single governmental remedy that included the express criminal sanction. Id at 555-56. This conveniently reduced double jeopardy to single jeopardy,
but appeared to admit that the "civil" half of that remedy was criminal in fact.
133. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 395-96 (1938). The Court in Marcus did
assert that respondents' criminal punishment "was not intended to compensate the government, in any manner, for damages it suffered as a result of successful execution of the conspiracy." 317 U.S. at 548. But the criminal provision in Mitchell had been construed to
impose a single fine or prison term for all fraudulent acts contributing to the same total
deficiency. The criminal provision in Marcus, however, had apparently been construed to
apply separately to each of respondents' interrelated projects, since the maximum fine for a
single violation was $5,000, far below the $54,000 assessment actually imposed. See 317
U.S. at 549. The Court applied the same interpretation to sustain the imposition of an aggregate $112,000 forfeiture for fifty-six violations of the civil "forfeit and pay" provision of
section 231, stating that
[u]nder respondents' view the lump sum to be paid would be about $30.00 a project; and we cannot suppose that Congress meant thus to reduce the damages recoverable for respondents' fraud and thereby allow them to spread the burden
progressively thinner overprojects each of which individually increasedtheirprofit.
317 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added). This approach implied that restitution to the government
played a substantial part, as a matter of the Court's threshold statutory construction, in the
imposition of both the fine and the forfeiture.
134. See Goldschmid, supra note 22, at 913-14, concluding that Mitchell, Marcus and
"[s]ubsequent cases provide little basis for further analysis. The typical opinion dealing
with classification concludes that a penalty is 'remedial' and therefore civil, or a 'punishment' and therefore criminal, and contains only the scantiest reasoning to justify the result."
See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956). The Court there upheld
section 26(b)(1) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 765, 780, 50 U.S.C. App. §
1635(b)(1) (1946) (repealed 1949), which permitted the government to recover a sum of
$2,000, plus double the amount of any damages incurred, plus costs of suit, from anyone
fraudulently obtaining or seeking to obtain benefits in connection with the disposition of
property under the act. The Court cited not only Marcus and relevant legislative reports
purporting to indicate Congress' nonpenal intent, 350 U.S. at 151-52, but also statutory language indicating that the civil remedies provided were "in addition to all other criminal
penalties." Id at 152. Such evidence scarcely demonstrated either that Congress' actual
intent was to create a civil sanction, or that the effect of these provisions placed them unequivocally beyond pertinent constitutional protections. But the Court used it to support
the proposition that "[t]he Government's recovery here is comparable to the recovery under
liquidated-damage provisions which fix compensation for anticipated loss." Id at 153.
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The Perez, Trop andNestor Decisions

Yet, in two denationalization decisions handed down on the same
day in 1958, the Court reached variant and bitterly-divided results that

looked beyond congressional classifications and turned entirely on the
justices' proclivity to infer rational nonpenal purposes from the challenged statute on its face. In Perez v. Brownell,13 5 the Court held, five to
four, that a statute which expatriated citizens without a prior hearing

simply for voting in foreign elections was constitutionally permissible. 3 6 The Court inferred that Congress had enacted the law in ques-

tion in order to avoid embarrassment in its conduct of foreign relations.
It also inferred the existence of a rational connection between the evil

sought to be remedied-involuntary American "embroilment" with
other countries through an individual's acts-and the remedy
37
imposed.'
In Trop v. Dulles,138 however, a plurality of the Court refused to
135. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
136. 356 U.S. at 62.
137. Id at 47-62. There was no legislative evidence that such embroilment had ever
occurred through the simple act of voting, and the challenged provision seemed effectively
to reach far beyond Congress' declared intent to "relieve this country of the responsibility of
those who reside in foreign lands and only claim citizenship when it serves their purpose."
I at 55 (quoting 86 CONG. REc. 11944 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Dickstein)). Indeed, on its
face, the enactment applied both to American residents and to citizens who never intended
any shift in allegiance. Id at 55-56. The majority (consisting of Justice Frankfurter, joined
by Justices Brennan, Burton, Clark and Harlan) stated that the essential question was
whether "the means, withdrawal of citizenship, [is] reasonably calculated to effect the end
that is within the power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the
conduct of our foreign relations attributable to voting by American citizens in foreign political elections." It held that it was, since "[t]he termination of citizenship terminates the
problem." Id at 60. This rationale might equally well have justified imposition of capital
punishment for fraud.
Chief Justice Warren's dissent went straight to the weakness of attributing a permissible
rational purpose to such an apparently overbroad remedy. After noting both actual indications of a narrower congressional intent underlying the enactment and the traditional legislative solicitude for the sacrosanct right of citizenship, he concluded that: "a government of
the people cannot take away their citizenship simply because one branch of that government
can be said to have a conceivably rational basis for wanting to do so." Id at 65, 73-75
(Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Black and Douglas, JJ.) (emphasis partly added). The
Chief Justice went on to say that "[t]he fatal defect in the statute before us is that its application is not limited to those situations that may rationally be said to constitute an abandonment of citizenship. . . . 'The connection between the fact proved and that presumed is not
sufficient."' Id at 76 (quoting Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 7 (1929)). See also id at 82
(Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Douglas & Black, JJ.) ("What the Court does is to make
it possible for any one of the many legislative powers to be used to wipe out or modify
specific rights granted by the Constitution, provided the action taken is moderate and does
not do violence to the sensibilities of a majority of this Court").
138. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The plurality opinion in this case was authored by Chief Jus-
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make the same attributions in order to sustain a provision imposing
expatriation after a conviction for desertion in wartime. 139 Instead, it
held that the statute on its face prescribed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, regardless of Congress'
underlying intent:
The purpose of taking away citizenship from a convicted deserter
is simply to punish him. There is no other legitimate purpose
that the statute could serve. Denationalization in this case is not
even claimed to be a means of solving international problems
*.*.. Here the purpose is punishment, and therefore the statute
is a penal law.
It is urged that this statute is not a penal law but a regulatory
provision authorized by the war power. It cannot be denied that
Congress has power to prescribe rules governing the proper performance of military obligations . . . . But a statute that
prescribesthe consequence that will befall one whofails to abideby
these regulatoryprovisionsis a penal law. . . . If this statute taking away citizenship is a congressional exercise of the war power,
then it cannot rationally be treated other than as a penal law,
because it imposes the sanction of denationalization for the purpose of punishing transgression of a 40standard of conduct prescribed in the exercise of that power.'
Though this conclusion might have been founded on Congress' appar-

ent desire to provide an additional punishment for desertion, the plurality opinion did not appear to rely on that ground.14 1 Instead, it

based its holding on the presumption that the only conceivable purpose
of the challenged law was punitive. It completely ignored the fact that
tice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker. Justice Brennan concurred
separately while Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissent in which Justices Burton, Clark and
Harlan joined.
139. Id at 94-101.
140. Id at 97-98 (emphasis added). The plurality did advert to actual congressional
intent, concluding it was "equivocal, and cannot possibly provide the answer to our inquiry." Id at 95. But it also stated that "even a clear legislative classification of a statute
as 'nonpenal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute." Id. at 95
(citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935); United States v. La Franca,
282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)). And it went on to treat as "controlling" the "evident purpose of
the legislature" said to be apparent on the face of the statute itself. Id at 96.
141. The plurality did note in passing that: "Plainly legislation prescribing imprisonment
for the crime of desertion is penal in nature. If loss of citizenship is substituted for imprisonment, it cannot fairly be said that the use of this particular sanction transforms the fundamental nature of the statute." Id at 97. This observation was beside the point, since the
statute did not substitute expatriation for imprisonment, which had also been imposed on
the petitioner in this case. Id at 87-88. Indeed, the fact that expatriation was imposed
only after a due process conviction for wartime desertion might equally well have supported
the inference that its purpose was the nonpenal one of "designat[ing] a reasonable ground of
eligibility for [continued citizenship]," as the plurality's approving reference to loss of voting
rights following a conviction for felony indicated. Id at 96-97.
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if its language were applied literally, both the provision involved in
Perez and any other regulatory provision prescribing "the consequence
that will befall one who fails to abide" by it would be penal. More
confusingly still, the decisive concurrence of Justice Brennan, who had
voted with the majority in Perez, admitted that expatriation of deserters might be sufficiently related to the exercise of the war power to
justify both loss of citizenship and other sanctions on either a penal or
nonpunitive basis, if the challenged provision were more narrowly
drawn.' 42 A powerful dissent would have followed Perez and sus143
tained the statute as nonpenal on rational-attribution grounds.
Two years later, in Flemming v. Nestor,'" the Court announced a
new and equally confusing test for determining the civil or criminal
status of a sanction. In sustaining as "civil" a law requiring an automatic, and apparently punitive, termination of social security benefits
for persons deported due to past membership in the Communist Party,
the Court stated:
142. See id at 106-07, 112-14 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan found the severity of denationalization to be "an important consideration where the asserted power to expatriate has only a slight or tenuous relation to the granted [war] power." Id at 110. On this
basis, he concluded that expatriation was beyond Congress' power to invoke as either punishment or remedy, since the questioned provision's relation to the effective conduct of war
was remote at best. Id at 111-14. This approach not only failed to consider Congress'
power to invoke other sanctions, but implied that use of such alternatives would per se be
permissible: "It is at the same time abundantly clear that these ends could more fully be
achieved by alternative methods not open to these objections." Id at 114.
The plurality also made the severity of the sanction a factor in its decision-making
calculus. Id at 96 n.18.
143. "It is not for us to deny that Congress might reasonably have believed the morale
and fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers knew that their fellows who had abandoned them in their time of need were to remain in the communion of
our citizens." 356 U.S. at 122 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Burton, Clark &
Harlan, JJ.) (emphasis added). See also id at 124-25:
Simply because denationalization was attached by Congress as a consequence of
conduct that it had elsewhere made unlawful, it does not follow that denationalization is a "punishment," any more than it can be said that loss of civil rights as a
result of conviction for a felony. . . is a "punishment" for any legally significant
purposes. . . . Since there are legislative ends within the scope o Congress' war
power that are wholly consistent with a '7onenal"purpose to reoulatethe military
forces, and since there is nothing on theface of this legislation er in its history to
indicate that Congress had a contrarypurpose, there is no warrant/orthis Court's
labeling the disabiliy imposed. . . a 'punishment." (emphasis added).
In subsequent denationalization cases, the Court avoided the punishment issue entirely,
resting its results instead on Congress' lack of power to employ such a sanction regardless of
its status. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815 (1971); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 823 (1976).
144. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The majority opinion was authored by Justice Harlan, who
was joined by Justices Clark, Frankfurter, Stewart and Whittaker.
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Where the source of legislative concern can be thought to be the
activity or status from which the individual is barred, the disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly upon
one affected. The contrary is the case where the statute in question is evidently aimed at the person or class of persons
disqualified.
• . . Where no persuasiveshowing of apurpose "to reach theperson, not the calling,".., has been made, the Court has not hampered legislative regulation of activities within . . . [Congress']
effects such regulation
sphere of concern, despite the often-severe
45
has had on the persons subject to it.1
This language appeared to reduce the category of sanctions that might
be found "penal' to those constituting explicit bills of attainder. 14 6 Indeed, both the facts and the majority's reasoning supported that interpretation. Nestor had lived in this country for forty-three years,
during which he had regularly made social security contributions.
Nevertheless, he was administratively deported a year after his retirement due to a relatively brief Party membership that had occurred at a
time when such activity was lawful. 4 7 That deportation automatically
terminated his retirement benefits under a social security amendment
linking such terminations to fourteen specified grounds of deportation,
all of which were either crimes or acts deemed to indicate severe moral
148
turpitude.
The majority's threshold ruling was that automatic termination of
Nestor's noncontractual retirement benefits did not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. 149 But the Court was
also compelled to deal with the claim that this termination imposed
punishment ex post facto, by bill of attainder and without criminal
safeguards. These claims were rejected by sleight of hand. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the majority, acknowledged the holding of Trop v.
Dulles,'50 which had recently invalidated a similarly broad-gauged
sanction and which seemed to militate in favor of the conclusion that
the Social Security Act amendment involved in Nestor was also punitive. But he discarded Trop and similar precedents by remarking that
145. Id at 614, 616 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
146. Id at 616. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946); Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
147. 363 U.S. at 605-06.
148. See, e.g., id at 604-06 & n.1, 618 & n.10. The deportation grounds included prostitution and narcotics addiction, as well as various criminal convictions and two types of subversive activity. Idat 618 n.10.
149. Id at 608-11. See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977).
150. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See notes 138-143 and accompanying text supra.
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each case must turn on "its own highly particularized context."''

He

suggested both that the severity of a sanction was irrelevant to its civil
or criminal status, and that the sanction in question was not punitive

because it was relatively mild, without explaining why lack of severity
could be utilized in making one determination but not the other.' 52 He
also asserted that Congress did not intend to punish the acts triggering

deportation because "even if a beneficiary were saved from deportation
only through discretionary suspension by the Attorney General...
[the benefit cut-off] would not reach him."' 5 3 Finally, he did not even
hesitate before the fact that the challenged provision specifically exempted four other classes of deportees from termination, that the acts

of those deportees were plainly treated as non-blameworthy and that
the challenged provision had repeatedly been described as penal during
its progress through Congress.' 54 Instead, he disregarded both objec-

tive and subjective indicia of congressional purpose, stating that:
It is impossible to find in this meagre history the unmistakable
evidence ofpunitive intent which. . . is requiredbefore a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down. Even were
that history to be taken as evidencing Congress' concern with the
grounds, rather than the fact, of deportation, we do not think that
this, standing alone, would suffice to establish a punitive purpose. This would still be a far cry from the situations involved in
such cases. . . where
55 the legislation was on itsface aimed atparticularindividuals.'
151. 363 U.S. at 615-16.
152. Id. at 616-17 & n.9.
153. Id at 619-20. The majority's reliance on such clemency to avert a conclusion of
penalty necessarily implied that the acts being excused were otherwise meant to be punished. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (plurality opinion), describing the nonpenal view of deportation itself as "highly fictional." Moreover, such reliance by the majority
in Nestor seemed analytically bankrupt. It could scarcely be contended, for example, that
the executive's power to pardon a convicted murderer changes the penal nature of the sanction imposed. A fortiori, the mere ability to exercise clemency cannot produce a "civil"
result.
154. See 363 U.S. at 618-20 & nn.10, 12-13 (majority opinion); id at 638-39 (Brennan,
J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. and Douglas, J.). The four classes of deportees exempted from the cut-off were those admitted as nonimmigrants who failed to maintain that
status, those institutionalized for mental disease within five years of entry, those becoming
public charges within five years of entry and those knowingly aiding others to enter illegally
within five years of their own entry. Id at 620 n.13. The last category was especially
suggestive of punitive intent. It was the only exempted category involving deportation for
knowing guilty conduct. As Justice Brennan pointed out, its failure to trigger benefit cutoffs could only be justified by an inference that Congress believed this particular conduct
less blameworthy than the other grounds for deportation for which termination was specified. Id at 639 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J. and Douglas, J.).
155. Id at 619 (emphasis added).
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The Court in Nestor accordingly sustained the benefit cut-off on the

basis of an attributed congressional intent to avoid supporting foreign
economies by continued payment of benefits to individuals residing
overseas. 156 Nestor's contention that this inferred "intent" was completely incompatible with the actual scope of the challenged provision
was dismissed because, said the majority, he had not proven beyond a

reasonable doubt that the sole intent of Congress was punitive:
Inferences drawn from the omission of [four whole classes of deportees] cannot establish, to the degree of certainty required, that
Congressional concern was wholly with [punishing] the acts leading to deportation, and not with the fact of deportation ....
The same answer must be made to arguments drawn from the
failure of Congress to apply [the benefit cut-off] to beneficiaries
residing abroad. . .. Congress may have failed to consider such
persons; or it may have thought their number too slight, or the
permanence of their voluntary residence abroad too uncertain, to
warrant application. . . . [W]e cannot with confidence reject all
those alternatives which imaginativeness can bring to mind, save
157
that one which might require the invalidation of the statute.
As the dissenters pointed out, this approach not only obscured the
evident fact that the challenged sanction was directed at specific acts

committed by particular individuals, but drew into question the whole
attribution theory by assuming that any inferential link between the
sanction and its legislative scheme would suffice to defeat a claim that
the questioned sanction was punitive. 58 However, if the challenged
156. See id at 611-12, 617.
157. Id at 620-21 (footnote omitted). See also id at 612 & n.5, where the majority
asserted that "it is irrelevant that the sanction does not extend to all to whom the postulated
rationale might in logic apply," but admitted that Congress might "have concluded that the
public purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support of those deported on the
grounds specified in the statute." (Emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
158. Id at 625-28 (Black, J., dissenting); id at 632-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at
635-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). Justice Black
stated that: "Whether this Act had 'rational justification' was . . . for Congress; whether it
" Id at 626 (Black, J., dissentviolates the Federal Constitution isfor us to determine ....
ing) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan noted acerbically that the majority:
escapes the common-sense conclusion that Congress has imposed punishment by
finding the requisite rational nexus to a granted power in the supposed furtherance
of the Social Security program. ... I do not understand the Court to deny that
but for that connection,. . . [the challenged provision] would impose punishment
[The Court] rejects the inference that the statute is "aimed at the person or
class of persons disqualified" by relying upon the presumption of constitutionality.
This presumption might be a basis for sustaining the statute if in fact there were
two opposing inferences which could reasonably be drawn from the legislation
. . [The Court] however, does not limit the presumption to that use. Rather
the presumption becomes a complete substitute for any supportable finding of a
rational connection. . . [of this provision] with the Social Security program.
Id at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.). He then pro-
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sanction did not rationally further the aims of legislation passed pursuant to a granted power, that sanction was invalid regardless of whether
it was civil or punitive.159 That such a nexus might be inferred for
broader due process purposes could not settle the issue of whether a
particular sanction was civil or criminal, as Justice Harlan's reliance on
a dispositive presumption of nonpenality to bridge this logical gap
clearly showed.
4. Recent Forfeiture Cases
Nestor was decided less than six months before the first round of
oral arguments in Mendoza-Martinez,16 0 and difficulties presented by
the ruling in Nestor may have stimulated the Court's attempt in Mendoza-Martinez to reconcile conflicting precedents by formulating general, objective tests for determining the civil or criminal status of a
challenged sanction. But the Court was unwilling or unable to pursue
in a principled fashion the implications of its objective criteria, and
subsequent cases only compounded this confusion.
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,l' a unanimous
Court held "quasi-criminal," and hence subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, a civil forfeiture proceeding authorized by
state law against any automobile used for illegal transportation of liquor.'62 The forfeiture in question had resulted in the loss of a vehicle
having a market value of $1,000, which was twice the maximum fine
that could be imposed for the crime of illegal transportation itself.'6 3
Though the Court's opinion relied primarily on the fact that "the forfeiture is clearly a[n additional] penalty for the criminal offense and
can result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution,"'" it neither cited nor distinguished Helvering r. Mitchell'6 5 or
United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess,'66 which appeared to mandate a
contrary result.
In United States v. UnitedStates Coin and Currency,6 7 the Court
ceeded to show that in light of the provision's facial distinctions and legislative history, only
the inference of vengeful intent could be maintained. Id at 637-40. See also Rogers v.
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 837-45 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
159. See 363 U.S. at 611-12 and cases cited.
160. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See notes 28-66 and accompanying text supra.
161. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-601 (Purdon 1964 Cum.Supp.).
163. 380 U.S. at 694-95 & n.2; id at 700-01 & nn.8-9.
164. Id at 701.
165. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
166. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See notes 124-133 and accompanying text supra.
167. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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held criminal, and hence subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, a civil in rem proceeding to forfeit $8,674
possessed by one Angelini, a professional gambler who had been convicted for failing to remit the requisite gambler's tax. 168 The proceeding was authorized by section 7302 of Title twenty-six of the United
States Code, which provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful to have or possess any property intended for use in violating provisions of the internal revenue laws . . and no property rights shall exist in any such
property ....',169 Angelini asserted the Fifth Amendment as a complete defense to the forfeiture proceeding, insisting that the government
could not punish indirectly through section 7302 his failure to declare
an illegal status that could not be punished directly. 7
The Court
unanimously agreed, stating that:
"proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture
of a man's property by reasons of offenses committed by him,
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal"
for Fifth Amendment purposes. . . .From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man who "forfeits" $8,674 because he had used the money in illegal gambling
activities and a man who pays a "criminal fine" of $8,674 as a
result of the same course of conduct. In both instances, money
liability is predicated upon a finding of the owner's wrongful
conduct; in both cases, the Fifth Amendment applies with equal

force. 171
The government's claim that section 7302 was not meant to punish
because it reached even innocent owners 172 was met with the response
that "a forfeiture statute, with such a broad sweep [would] raise serious
73
constitutional questions" of due process and just compensation.
168. Id at 716. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411-4412, 4901 (1970).
169. 26 U.S.C. § 7302 (1970).
170. See 401 U.S. at 716-17; United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 393 F.2d
499, 500 (7th Cir. 1968). The Court had recently held that the government could not prosecute gamblers who properly asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a defense to their failure to comply with the gambling registration provisions
requiring them to declare their illegal occupation. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The incrimination clause was involved in United States Coin because the basis of the government's claim that Angelini's
money was intended for use in violating the revenue laws was his failure to declare bookmaking activities. See 401 U.S. at 716, 722 n.9. Since Marchetti and Grosso were said to
deal with conduct that cannot be constitutionally punishable in the first instance, the Court
was willing to apply retroactively the rule announced in those two decisions. See id at 72224.
171. 401 U.S. at 718 (emphasis in original) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
634 (1886)).
172. See id at 718-19.
173. Id at 720-21. The government noted that the challenged forfeiture action was an
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Moreover, the Court continued, as a matter of statutory construction,
such forfeiture plainly was "intended to impose a penalty only upon
those . . . significantly involved in a criminal enterprise,"' 74 since the
Treasury was required to remit any forfeiture incurred without willful
negligence or violative intent. 7 5 This approach recalled the assumption underlying Helwig v. United States'76 and its progeny that any
sanction meant to regulate conduct and deter wrongdoing was inherently penal regardless of Congress' expressed intent; again Mitchelland
Marcus were not cited.
Yet in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,177 an equally
unanimous Court relied on both these earlier rulings in holding civil
and compensatory a more severe federal forfeiture statute. The intervenor in Emerald Cut Stones had been indicted and acquitted under a

felony provision proscribing willful and knowing smuggling of articles8
7
into the country without submitting to required customs procedures. 1

The government then instituted a civil forfeiture proceeding pursuant
to section 1497 of Title nineteen of the United States Code, which more
broadly provides that any undeclared item "shall be subject to forfei-

ture and such person shall be liable to a penalty equal to the value of
such article."' 179 As a defense to this action, the intervenor raised a

claim of double jeopardy. The structure of the statutory scheme suggested, as did the relevant legislative history, that Congress viewed the
forfeiture provision as a lesser included offense and had enacted

stronger felony sanctions to deter knowing violations of customs
in rem proceeding in which the money itself was the formal respondent charged with the
commission of an actionable wrong. Id at 720 & n.5. In response to the contention that in
light of the historical nature of such forfeiture proceedings, section 7302 applied to innocent
property owners, the Court admitted that this historical view was not ' ithout support, id at
720, but observed that it had in the past "recognized the difficulty of reconciling the broad
scope of traditional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment."
Id at 721. The precise constitutional question was not pursued, however, because the
Court rejected the government's claim on the basis of its construction of section 7302 in
conjunction with other relevant statutes. See note 174 and accompanying text infra.
174. Id at 721-22 (footnote omitted).
175. See 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976), authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, upon a
showing of lack of willfulness or intent, to return the seized property "upon such terms and
conditions as he deems reasonable and just." While this remission provision appears in
Title nineteen of the United States Code, which regulates forfeitures under the customs laws,
the remission provisions of that title are made expressly applicable to forfeitures under the
internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7327 (1970). See 401 U.S. at 721 n.8.
176. 188 U.S.'605 (1903). See notes 67-79 and accompanying text supra.
177. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976). See 409 U.S. at 232-33.
179. 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1976).
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laws. 80° That suggestion was reinforced by the fact that a separate provision of Title nineteen authorized remittance of forfeitures "incurred
without willful negligence or without any intention. . . to violate the
law." "8 I The opinion in United States Coin had construed this provision as conclusive evidence of a penal intent to reach only blameworthy
conduct.'8 2 But the Court in Emerald Cut Stones simply recited the

Mitchell formula that Congress could and did order both civil and
criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing them, and added that section
1497 merely afforded the government liquidated damages for the expenses of enforcement, which despite their comparative severity were
not "so unreasonable or excessive" as to be penal.' 3 The forfeitureremittance provision deemed important in United States Coin184 was

not even mentioned; and both UnitedStates Coin and Plymouth Sedan
were distinguished on the illogical basis that the forfeiture laws in-

decisions, unlike section 1497, required proof of a crimvolved in those
85
offense.
inal
Despite their divergent results, Plymouth Sedan, United States

Coin and Emerald Cut Stones all indicated that proof of criminal conduct, excessive severity and Congress' intent to punish as indicated by
the face of the challenged provision were at least relevant to a sanction's civil or criminal status. But in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
180. The forfeiture provision of section 1497 was originally enacted as part of the Tariff
Act of 1922, 46 Stat. 964. It was re-enacted in the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 728, which
added a criminal sanction, 46 Stat. 751, that later became 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976). See note
178 supra. Section 1497 appeared in Part III ("Ascertainment, Collection, and Recovery of
Duties") of Title IV ("Administrative Provisions") of the 1930 Act. In contrast, section 545
was part of the "Enforcement Provisions" of the Act and was later incorporated in the federal criminal code. See 409 U.S. at 236.
181. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
182. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971). See
notes 174-175 and accompanying text supra.
183. 409 U.S. at 235-37.
184. See notes 174-175 and accompanying text supra.
185. 409 U.S. at 236 n.6. The Court's conclusion that no criminal offense was required
to trigger a forfeiture under section 1497 rested on the assumption that a single act of importation without following customs procedures could result in the "civil" forfeiture. Id In
contrast, a knowing, fraudulent failure to declare was required for a "criminal" forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976), the criminal counterpart of section 1497. See 409 U.S. at
232-35 & nn.l-2. As a threshold matter, the Court's assumption was correct. But under 19
U.S.C. § 1618 (1976), see note 175 and accompanying text supra, the Treasury was required
to remit, upon petition, all customs forfeitures or penalties except those incurred through
willful negligence or deliberate violative intent. Thus, the practical difference between sections 545 and 1497 was not apparent. The Court in EmeraldCut Stones never attempted to
explain what more was necessary to establish a knowing, fraudulent criminal forfeiture, beyond the finding of violative intent needed to make a "civil" forfeiture permanent.
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Leasing Co., 18 6 the Court appeared to discard even these criteria, hold-

ing "punitive and deterrent,"'' 87 but completely beyond pertinent constitutional protections, a Puerto Rican law that prescribed the forfeiture
of a $20,000 yacht leased to an occupant who had been found to possess
a single marijuana cigarette.1 88 The relevant provision of the commonwealth's code authorized summary seizure of any instrumentality
used to transport controlled substances and the challenged seizure was
effected without prior actual notice to the yacht's lessor.18 9 Forfeiture
became automatic when the lessor, whose innocence was admitted, understandably failed to contest the seizure within fifteen days.' 90 The
Court acknowledged the legislature's intent to enforce criminal drug
sanctions through such forfeitures, but rejected both the owner's innocence and the sanction's severity as grounds for overturning the challenged provision, stating that:
Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive
and deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold
: * . the application of other forfeiture statutes to the property of
innocents. Forfeiture of conveyances that have been used. . . in

violation of the narcotics laws fosters the purposes served by the
underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use
of the conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby
rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. .

.

.To the extent that

such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation
may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater
care in transferring possession of their property. 19'
This reasoning explained neither how illegal behavior could be
rendered unprofitable by penalizing an owner who had not acted Wegally, nor what legitimate purpose was served by inducing that owner
to exhibit greater care in selecting lessees where no notice of the proscribed activity could conceivably have been obtained.'92 Instead, the
Court relied on the unique historical status of deodand and similar in
186. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
187. Id at 686.
188. See id at 664-68 & n.4 (majority opinion); id at 693 (Douglas. J., dissenting).
189. P.R. LAWS ANN.tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4) & (b) (Supp. 1976); id tit. 34 § 1722 (1971 &
Supp. 1976). Possession itself was a crime under the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto
Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2101-2607 (Supp. 1976), under which the lessee was subsequently prosecuted. See 416 U.S. at 665.
190. 416 U.S. at 667-68. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34 § 1722(a) (1971). Although the
statute provided for notice to either the "owner of the property seized or the person in
charge thereof," only the lessee had registered the vessel with harbor authorities and, as a
result, only he was notified. See 416 U.S. at 665 n.2, 667-68 & n.3.
191. 416 U.S. at 686-88 (footnote omitted). See id at 679, 685.
192. Indeed, with respect to secured creditors, the Court's remarks regarding greater care
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rem forfeiture proceedings that had been sustained even though innocent parties suffered as a result.193 But as the Court itself acknowledged, the more recent forfeiture cases that it discussed involved

federal laws that imposed no permanent loss on innocent parties because those laws were uniformly subject to statutorily-prescribed remittance for non-blameworthy conduct. 194 Since the Puerto Rican statute

lacked such a remittance feature, it presented precisely the type of indiscriminate forfeiture that the Court in United States Coin had
abjured. 195
Indeed, the logic of United States Coin would seem to have man-

dated invalidation of the statute at issue in Calero-Toledo. If a forfei196
ture limited in effect to those responsible for criminal conduct
required procedural safeguards, an expressly punitive forfeiture drafted
to impose sanctions upon innocent parties would seem even more
clearly to require similar protections. Yet the Court converted the
overbreadth of the Puerto Rican law into a reason for sustaining it,
distinguishing the statute at issue in United States Coin on the ground

that the commonwealth's code provision was "not limited in application to persons 'significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.' "19 It
admitted that serious due process problems might result from such
sweeping application of this provision, noting that:
it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner
whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him
[by the illegal actor] without his privity or consent. . . the same
might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that
seemed entirely inapposite, since such creditors neither possess transferred property nor are
empowered to transfer it.
193. See 416 U.S. at 680-86. At common law, the value of an inanimate object causing
the accidental death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand, ie., something given to God. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7-28 (1881). The practice did not
become part of American common law, but as the Court in EmeraldCut Stones pointed out,
similar in rem proceedings enforcing forfeitures of commodities and vessels used in violation of customs and revenue laws had long been recognized. 416 U.S. at 683 (citing C.J.
Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 145-48 (1943); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623
(1886)).
194. See 416 U.S. at 689-90 & n.27.
195. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1971),
mentioning both Blackstone's condemnation of such innocent forfeitures as a "superstition"
springing from "blind feudalism," 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND c.8 *300 (3d ed. 1884), and the "difficulty" of reconciling the "broad scope of
traditional forfeiture doctrine" with the strictures of the Fifth Amendment.
196. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719, 721-22
(1971).
197. 416 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
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he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would
served legitimate purposes
be difficult to conclude that forfeiture
1 98
and was not unduly oppressive.
But the Court made no effort to explain why the instant forfeiture did

not fit within this "oppressive" rubric. Despite the fact that the yacht's
owner was precluded by the lapse of fifteen days from raising any nonconstitutional defense and had shown not only that he was "uninvolved

in and unaware of the wrongful activity" in question, but also that he
had included in his lease a provision barring the commission of unlaw-

ful activity by lessees, the Court dismissed his claims of oppressiveness
with the cavalier remark that he "voluntarily entrusted the lessees with
possession of the yacht, and no allegation has been made or proof of-

fered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid having
its property put to an unlawful use."' 99 Thus, notwithstanding Trop v.
Dulles2°° and subsequent cases, Calero-Tledo seems to hold not only
that Congress may avoid criminal restraints by deliberately seeking to

punish innocent parties, if not guilty ones, but also that a rational relation to a punitive purpose may suffice to sustain, as civil, sanctions that
cannot be justified on any nonpenal ground.210
198. Id at 689-90 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). As this passage seemed to acknowledge and as Justice Douglas pointed out, see id at 692-93 (Douglas, J., dissenting), the
same objection might have been raised with respect to the Court's reliance on other cases
sustaining forfeitures of the property of innocent owners as the only adequate means of
suppressing the proscribed offense or as establishing a secondary defense against a forbidden use. Id at 684, 686 (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926); United States
v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844)). If express criminal sanctions levelled against the proscribed conduct did not deter that conduct, it is difficult to understand
what legitimate governmental purpose might be furthered by imposing an additional derivative forfeiture on owners who possessed neither notice of such conduct nor any reasonable
means of interdicting it.
199. 416 U.S. at 690. See also id at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
would at least have remanded the case in order to require the state to prove, as a condition
of forfeiture, that "the illegal use was of such magnitude or notoriety that the owner cannot
be found faultless in remaining ignorant of its occurrence." Id at 6144.
200. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See notes 137-143 and accompanying text supra.
201. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), where the Court again divided,
in an Eighth Amendment context, over the constitutional nature of "punishment." The
issue was whether the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishments
barred the paddling of school children. The majority held that such paddling was not "punishment" within the ambit of the Amendment, because that Amendment had traditionally
been limited to punishments imposed through criminal process. Consequently, the majority
continued, there was "an inadequate basis for wrenching the Eighth Amendment from its
historical context and extending it to traditional disciplinary practices in public schools."
Id at 669. This conclusion effectively adopted the approach of Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391 (1938), see notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra, by holding that such paddling was not "punishment" because the legislature had not sought to impose it through
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Calero-Toledo might partially be explained as resulting from the
Court's belief in the special, separate nature of in rem forfeitures, an

explanation supported by the opinion's failure to cite any of the normal
civil-criminal precedents discussed earlier. The case's result might also

be attributed to the relatively limited impact of money penalties. Such
sanctions do not threaten personal reputation or liberty, and there is no
indication in Calero-Toledo or the other forfeiture rulings that governmental attempts to impose derivative imprisonment could proceed

without criminal safeguards. But those explanations founder on the
logical force of the Court's own remark that "from the relevant consti-

tutional standpoint, there is no difference" between a man who forfeits
a sum of money and one who pays that sum as a criminal fine imposed
for the same course of conduct.2 "2 Functionally speaking, this state0 3 conment appears inarguable; and if Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinei2
stituted a tacit effort to develop a principled general theory of civilcriminal classification, it is difficult not to conclude that Calero-Toledo
significantly abandoned that attempt. Notwithstanding Justice Holmes'
faith in the ability of old bottles to receive new wine, 20 4 it remains proexplicit criminal process. Nevertheless, the majority admitted that "[s]ome punishments,
though not labelled 'criminal' by the State may be sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments to justify application of the Eighth Amendment." 430 U.S. at 669 n.37. But it made
no attempt to reconcile this possibility with its holding; and it quite remarkably cited Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), both of
which had turned on functional or purposive analyses of whether a given sanction was penal, in support of the proposition that "the State does not acquire the power to punish with
which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication
of guilt in accordance with due process of law." 430 U.S. at 671-72 n.40.
The dissenters took sharp issue with this use of Trop, stating that the majority failed to
apply the doctrine of that case:
The majority would have us believe that the determinative factor in Trop was that
the petitioner had been convicted of desertion; yet there is no suggestion in Trop
that the disposition of the military court-martial had anything to do with the decision in that case. Instead, while recognizing that the Eighth Amendment extends
only to punishments that are penal in nature, the plurality adopted a purposive
approach for determining when punishment is penal.
Id at 687 n.3 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.). Thus, the
dissenters argued, "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which a punishment
is inflicted has been labeled as criminal, but whether the purpose of the deprivation is
" Id at 686-87. That the Eighth
among those ordinarily associated with punishment ..
Amendment reached more than "criminal" sanctions, and that the determination that a
sanction constituted punishment was accordingly the beginning rather than the end of analysis did not, in the dissenters' view, alter the importance of that threshold determination. See
id at 686 & n.2. Thus, Wright also turned on the type of scrutiny-subjective versus objective consideration, review of legislative history versus statutory construction, analysis of intent versus analysis of effect-with which a sanction's status was approached.
202. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971).
203. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See notes 28-66 and accompanying text supra.
204. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

foundly disturbing that a mechanical law of deodands that long preceded our concept of substantive criminal law should continue to limit
constitutional protections. Helvering v. Mitchel205 and its descendants
raised the troubling possibility that the legislature's sanctioning power
might be virtually unlimited so long as the proper "civil" signals were
used. Calero-Toledo suggested that the same lack of constraint might
follow where the legislative intent was clearly to punish. This suggestion was scarcely tempered by possible arguments that the civil forfeiture proceeding in Calero-Toledo neither imputed blame nor punished
wrongful conduct with imprisonment. The final passages of CaleroToledo plainly did impute blame and civil imprisonment as part of our
jurisprudence as well.
In sum, after as well as before Calero-Toledo,the question remains
whether, and to what extent, there exist principled limits on the legislature's power to impose sanctions without criminal safeguards. That
question was directly reflected in the OSHA decisions to which this
article now turns.
III. Application of the Civil/Criminal Distinction to OSHA
The Irey Case
The leading appellate decisions sustaining the civil nature of
OSHA's "civil" money sanctions divided perceptibly along these
crossed lines between "objective" and "subjective" analysis, between
inferred and actual legislative purpose, between the effect of a sanction
and its intrinsic nature. In Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, °s the
Third Circuit essentially applied the approach utilized in Helvering v.
Mitchell, °7 treating the civil-criminal issue as a matter of statutory
construction controlled by the objective intent to create a "remedial"
sanction evinced by Congress' use of "civil" terminology in the statute's
text and by its placement of penalty provisions in OSHA's civil section.
The Court acknowledged tacitly the functional difficulties created by
United States Coin in light of the fact that "as to a corporation, the
criminal punishment of a fine of $10,000.00 is precisely the same as a
A.

civil penalty for a willful violation . . . ."8 It also noted that the
205. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
206. 519 F.2d 1200 (3rd Cir. 1974), ajfdon this issue, 519 F.2d 1215 (3rd Cir. 1975) (en
banc), affd without consideringthepoint sub non. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S.
442 (1977).
207. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
208. See 519 F.2d at 1204 & n.8 (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency,
401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971)). Since the "civil" willful violation at hand had resulted in an
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label attached to a sanction by Congress does not, ipsofacto, preclude
the possibility that the procedures used to enforce such a sanction
might infringe rights guaranteed by the Constitution. z0 9 But the court
made no attempt to go beyond such labels, suggesting that because
larger penalties had been sustained as civil in nature under other statutes, "no such infraction has occurred here."2 ' Instead, the Third Circuit concluded that Congress could impose both civil and criminal
sanctions for the same conduct, and that "while the punitive aspects of
the OSHA penalties, particularly for a 'willful' violation, are far more
apparent than any 'remedial' features . . . . [w]e have now come too
far down the road to hold that a civil penalty may not be assessed to
enforce observance of legislative policy."12 1' Moreover, the Third Circuit added, it was unnecessary to apply the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martine 212 "because the congressional intent is
clear."21 3 This statement was apparently based on the assumption that
Congress' intent to create a civil sanction was clear on the face of the
statute.
The analysis undertaken by the appellate panel in Irey actually
never came to grips with the problem. The fact that Congress is empowered to assess civil penalties for acts that are also punishable as
crimes provides no assurance that the "civil penalties" exacted by section 666 of Title twenty-nine of the United States Code2 14 are, in fact,
nonpenal. In light of this observation and the appellate panel's own
admission that those penalties lacked readily identifiable remedial features, its failure to engage in a far more exacting scrutiny of the structure and legislative history of section 666 appears inexplicable.
Equally inexplicable was the panel's curt refusal to apply the criteria of
Mendoza-Martinez on the ground that congressional intent to create a
civil sanction was clear. This approach ignored the fact that by the
employee's death when an improperly shored trench collapsed on a worker, id at 1201-02,
the criminal provision might also have been invoked. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), (e) (1970).
209. 519 F.2d at 1204. While the court mentioned the axiom that labels alone could not
be dispositive, it cited American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 515 (8th Cir.
1974), which had briefly rejected a similar Sixth Amendment complaint with the remark
that: "[c]ivil
penalties are not uncommon in federal law, and Congress here clearly intended
to create a civil sanction. Helvering v. Mitchell.
210. 519 F.2d at 1204.
211. See id at 1204 & n.9. This passage seemed effectively to conclude, as had Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), that money penalties were inherently civil regardless of
their severity. At the very least it indicated that money penalties in the limited amounts
prescribed under OSHA possessed such civil characteristics.
212. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See notes 28-66 and accompanying text supra.
213. 519 F.2d at 1205 (footnote omitted).
214. For a detailed discussion of section 666, see note 5 supra.
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Court's own terms, those criteria could only be discarded where there
was clear evidence of a subjective intent topunish as demonstrated by
the relevant legislative history." 5 Absent such evidence, a court was
obliged to apply the seven factors to the face of the statute itself before
arriving at any conclusion. Perhaps most puzzlingly, the panel in Irey
seemed aware that, judged in light of either the criteria expressed in
Mendoza-Martinez or Senator Dominick's actual statement of legislative purpose, congressional intent to create a civil sanction was itself
less than clear.21 6 Thus, the approach taken by the court in Irey raised
but did not resolve the question of what type of "intent," as evinced by
what type of legislative materials, was relevant to the drawing of civilcriminal distinctions in a given case. Instead, the court disposed of the
Sixth Amendment challenge by a series of ipse dixits that were, if anything, less illuminating and more troublesome than those employed by
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Mitchelfl 7 itself.
B. The Atlas Case
In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC2 18 a panel of the Fifth Circuit
attempted to adopt a contrasting approach. It acknowledged external
limits on Congressional power no matter how clearly the "civil" intent
of the legislators was expressed: "although Congress has enormous
flexibility in the selection of enforcement measures, the existence of
both civil and criminal alternatives does not alone suffice to validate
the statute. Similarly, the absence of any mention of punishment in
the legislative history does not immunize the statute from further review. ' 2 19 'The court noted that absent clear evidence of punitive intent,
the distinctions appearing on the face of the challenged enactment itself
could not be dispositive, and that the functional analysis of MendozaMartinez accordingly provided "[tlhe starting place. . . to test Congressional intent and permissible Congressional latitude in prescribing
civil rather than criminal consequences. 2 20 It then embarked on a
similar functional analysis that once again demonstrated the inability
of the Supreme Court's seven factors, standing by themselves, to serve
as an effective means of resolving concrete cases.
215. See 372 U.S. at 168-70. The opposite result would subordinate constitutional protections to Congress' intent-precisely what the Mendoza-Mardnez factors were designed to
avert. See 519 F.2d at 1205 & n.12.
216. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
217. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
218. 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), af/'d without consideringthepoint,430 U.S. 442 (1977).
219. 518 F.2d at 1000 (footnotes omitted).
220. Id
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Initially, the Fifth Circuit found that section 666 did impose an
affirmative disability or restraint because it inflicted a "pocket-book
deterrence" upon one compelled to pay the penalty assessed. 22 ' The
first of the seven criteria was thus said to favor Atlas. But history was
said to work against Atlas because monetary penalties "have long been
accepted [as civil in nature] where they served a remedial rather than a
punitive function. ' 2 22 Any scrutiny of whether the sanction in question had historically been considered punitive would therefore cause
the court to confront again the civil-criminal classification issue such
scrutiny was supposed to resolve. However, the third factor of scienter
presented greater difficulties, since Atlas had been sanctioned under
sections 666(b) and (j), which prescribe a penalty of up to $1,000 for
"serious" violations and incorporate some degree of scienter by affording cited employers a defense of lack of knowledge.2 23 The possibility
of a "civil" willful violation under section 666(a) 22 4 was still more
troubling, since, as Atlas argued, the state of mind required for such a
violation coincided even more clearly with traditional notions of criminal responsibility. The Fifth Circuit avoided both difficulties by expressing no view on section 666(a) and assuming that criminal scienter
comprised only deliberately violative acts:
JT]his is not a requirement analogous to the criminal law concept
embraced in the conclusory "scienter" concept. The employer
has a defense if he did not or should not have known. But this is
a far cry from limiting his obligations to situations in which he
knowingly and intentionally acted or refrained from acting. The
statute itself expressly distinguishes between acts which on usual
tort principles
are charged to employers and those willfully
25
done.2

The fourth factor, whether or not the challenged sanction promotes retribution or deterrence, also raised difficulties. Atlas pointed out that a
system of "civil penalties" graduated according to the employer's
knowledge and the gravity of the violation not only has a retributive
effect upon the offending employer but also deters others from committing similar violations. The government responded that such effects
221. Id. at 1001.
222. Id (footnote omitted).
223. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), (j) (1970). While the panel mentioned only section 666(b)
as the basis of the citation against Atlas, section 666(j), which defines a "serious" violation,
was necessarily included.
224. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970). See note 5 supra.
225. 518 F.2d at 1001-02 (footnote omitted). The court at this point erroneously assumed that scienter embodies some single "criminal law concept." In fact the term connotes
a variety of states of mind, depending upon the statutory context in which it is used. See
note 37 supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

also flow from "remedial" statutes because the adjective "'remedial'
means not only compensatory but a kind of prospective deterrence...
to encourage compliance with the government regulation."22 6 The
court correctly agreed that deterrence is a function of all sanctions and
that the mere fact that a penalty is imposed to deter conduct does not
make it criminal.227 This observation suggested that the fourth criterion of Mendoza-Martinez was irrelevant, not merely inconclusive.
But while the Fifth Circuit appeared to indicate that this factor lent
"some weight to both sides,"228 a close reading of its discussion suggests
that on this point the government prevailed.
The next factor was whether the penalty applied to behavior that
was already proscribed as a crime. On this point, the Fifth Circuit also
said that the government prevailed. It noted that although willful violations of safety standards resulting in the death of an employee could
expose an employer to both criminal sanctions and a civil penalty,2 29 in
the majority of instances, as exemplified by Atlas' "serious" violation,
the "civil penalty" imposed by administrative enforcement procedures
was the only possible sanction. While this observation was correct so
far as OSHA alone was concerned, the court glossed over the equally
pertinent possibility that "serious" conduct might be criminal under a
wholo separatestatute. Atlas in fact argued that OSHA was exacting a
sanction for building code violations punishable as crimes under state
and municipal law. The appellate panel cited Helvering v. Mitchelp0
in dismissing this argument, stating that "[n]ow in the Twentieth Century it is too late to assert that there is anything improper in the election
by Congress to impose both its own sanctions-civil, criminal or
both-without regard to its treatment by other components of our
federalism." 23 '
226. 518 F.2d at 1002.
227. Id at 1002, 1009.
228. Id at 1002.
229. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), (e) (1970). See note 5 supra.
230. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
231. 518 F.2d at 1010. To the extent that this passage rested on AMitchellas authority for
the proposition that it is too late to argue that Congress' regulatory choices are restricted by
state action, it doubtless referred to Mitchel's tacit restriction of the older dogma that any
federal sanction meant to coerce conduct rather than raise revenue fell within the states'
police powers and was beyond Congress' authority to impose. That dogma is perhaps best
represented by United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935), see notes 93-99 and accompanying text supra, in which the Court characterized a federal excise tax on persons
violating local liquor laws as:
a clear invasion of the police power, inherent in the States, reserved from the grant
of powers to the federal government by the Constitution. We think the suggestion
has never been made-certainly never entertained by this court-that the United
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The Fifth Circuit then confronted the sixth and most suggestive of
the factors listed in Mendoza-Marinez-whether a purpose other than
punishment may rationally be attributed to the challenged sanction-and refused to apply it. In the apparent belief that application
of this test required invalidation of all sanctions except those that most
effectively further the goals sought to be achieved by the enacting legislature, rather than providing a principled means for deferring to the
regulatory purposes evident in a scheme of enforcement already selected by Congress, the appellate panel explained this refusal as
follows:
Unless caution is exercised, [this test] puts the judiciary squarely
in the middle of choices as to the kinds of remedies open and
those most likely to achieve the legislative aim. What do Judges
know about hazards of industry save what they see in the tragic
case after the event of death or injury? Congress meant to put an
end to the maiming or death of thousands. What facilities do
Judges have for making inquiry into or evaluating what is the
best calculated to bring about the saving of life and
method
232
Jimb?

Having thus refused to attempt an express rational attribution, the
Fifth Circuit nonetheless tacitly proceeded to make such an attribution
in its disposition of the seventh and final factor of excessiveness in light
of any alternative nonpenal purpose that might be assigned to the challenged sanction. The court purported to find that the $600 penalty
exacted from Atlas for failure adequately to cover roof openings that
resulted in the death of one of its employees was calculated carefully
with reference to "the gravity of the offense, the size of the business, the
233
good faith of the employer and the history of previous violations.
But in arriving at this conclusion, the appellate panel admitted that
comparative excessiveness is a subjective factor. Instead, it simply asserted that the remedial functions obviously served by the civil penalties of OSHA justified their imposition through administrative
process.23 4
States may impose cumulative penalties above and beyond those specified by state
law for infractions of the State's criminal code by its own citizens. The affirmation
of such a proposition would obliterate the distinction between the delegated powers of the federal government and those reserved to the States and to their citizens.
Id at 295-96. See also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1953) (distinguishing
Constantine'sTenth Amendment discussion on the ground that that case involved a federal
tax imposed for violation of state law while the gambling tax sustained in Kahrigerapplied
to all persons engaged in the business of wagering, regardless of whether their activity also
violated state law).
232. 518 F.2d at 1010 (footnote omitted).
233. Id. at 1011.
234. Id at 1010. The court also stated that "we cannot say that [Atlas' $600] penalty is
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Having considered individually each of the factors listed in Mendoza-Martinez, the Fifth Circuit should have proceeded to balance
them carefully in reaching a decision. It did not do so, however. Instead, it abandoned further reliance on such criteria and elected abruptly to rest on the assumption, advanced by Heh'ering v.Mitchell,3 5
that because Congress may impose both civil and criminal sanctions,
administrative money penalties are inherently classifiable under the
former category. This assumption led directly to the conclusion that
Atlas had failed to demonstrate that Congress meant the statute to reprimand rather than regulate:
The focus of the statute-the control of job site safety practices
and health conditions-has a demonstrable and legitimate government concern. The fact that the civil enforcement sanctions
are inherently disabilities does not alter the nature of the Congressional purpose. And finally the Congressional purpose carefully to establish both civil and criminal sanctions and
distinguishable procedures for imposing and reviewing them
eliminate any question of congressional intent. As Judge
Friendly puts it. . . "When Congress has characterized the remedy as civil and the only consequence of a judgment for the Government is a money penalty, the courts have taken Congress at its
word." For these reasons Atlas, despite its strenuous efforts to
show the punitive character of OSHA, must fail on this issue." 6
Like that of Mitchell itself, this reasoning begged the fundamental
question because a statute that regulates may also contain sanctions
intended to reprimand. Moreover, that reasoning appeared to ignore
the point that the mere presence of a legitimate government concern
with job safety and health was irrelevant to the civil-criminal classification issue. Merely because Congress has the power to legislate on a
certain subject does not mean that the specific way in which it has legislated is presumptively permissible. z37 Thus, the decision in Atlas was
excessive [fin the consideredjudgment of the Administrative Agency it results in improved
industrial practices that help to prevent future deaths from falls of [Atlas'] employees." Id
at 1011 (emphasis added). This statement made no sense as a matter of either logic or
precedent. Criminal penalties would plainly promote safe practices as well or better and
have often been sustained on the basis of this rationale in other statutory contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 303
U.S. 239 (1938). The authorized penalty was to be tested for excessiveness on its face, not as
applied more leniently in particular instances. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 169 & n.28 (1963). Moreover, to defer to the agency'sjudgment of excessiveness was to
subordinate the Sixth Amendment to administrative discretion. Sec note 215 supra.
235. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-123 and accompanying text supra.
236. 518 F.2d at 1011 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1974)).
237. See notes 155-159 and accompanying text supra.

Summer 1978)

OSHA AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

not merely based on reasons as conclusory as those expressed in Irey,
but it also rested on virtually the same reasons as those expressed in
Irey, though they were reached by a different route.

C. General Observations
Against the backdrop of prior case law, the Irey and Atlas decisions raised a distinct possibility that the Supreme Court would consider them in yet another attempt to reconcile its prior efforts to

distinguish civil from criminal sanctions.

Petitioners for certiorari

powerfully asserted that the Fifth Circuit in Atlas abdicated its respon-

to explore rational nonpenal purposes for OSHA's
sibility by refusing
2 38
"civil" sanctions,

and that the Third Circuit in Irey had given unduly conclusive weight to legislative labels. Moreover, petitioners
maintained, frey permitted the government to determine their constitu-

tional protections, since the "willful" violation in that case allowed the
enforcers of OSHA to proceed either criminally or civilly, despite the
fact that the employer's conduct and the resulting corporate sanction
would be identical.23 9
Perhaps for comprehensive regulatory schemes, the practical test
was the formula of Judge Friendly quoted in Atlas. That formula es-

sentially implied that the generic impact of money sanctions designated
as "civil" was insufficient to require the invalidation of an enforcement
structure crafted by Congress.2 4° This formula could not be completely
dispositive of all challenges, however, because even limited civil money
sanctions might produce deleterious effects far exceeding those arising

from, for example, a ten-day jail sentence.24 Nevertheless, short of im238. Petition for certiorari at 13-18 & n.8, Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990
(5th Cir. 1975), affld, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
239. Petition for certiorari at 18-21, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F. 2d 1200 (3d.
Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Petitioners' [Joint] Reply Memorandum in Support of
Certiorari at 2-5, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430
U.S. 442 (1977); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), afi'd,430 U.S.
442 (1977).
240. See note 236 and accompanying text supra Cf.Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
32-34, 36-37 (1972) (implied no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for "criminal" offenses
not resulting in imprisonment or other loss of liberty). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 675-82 (1977) (the "aberration" of occasionally severe corporal punishment in
public schools held insufficient, in light of perceived restraints created by state tort law, to
require prior due process hearings before all such punishment could be imposed). As these
rulings and that of J.B. Williams suggest, it is the inherent or generic effect of a prescribed
sanction, not the particular effects resulting from its specific applications, with which threshold inquiries should be concerned.
241. Even a $10,000 penalty--the maximum civil sanction authorized by OSHA for a
first-instance offense, see note 5 supra-mightafflict marginal proprietors with bankruptcy
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prisonment, denationalization or sanctions of equal generic impact,
Judge Friendly's test might appropriately limit inquiries regarding the
constitutional status of sanctions to the issue of their effect as applied.2 42 Moreover, within that restrictive as-applied framework, which
largely precludes successful Sixth Amendment challenges to the civil
penalties provided by other regulatory statutes 243 as well as OSHA, 2 4 a
and such secondary effects as mortgage foreclosures on personal homes and property. In
view of this country's "traditional aversion to imprisonment for debt," Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 498 (1943), the more drastic specter of working one's natural life to
satisfy regulatory penalties exacted for violations of safety and health standards might be
difficult to assuage by asserting that civil due process protections are sufficient. See also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 51-52 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). The federal code
tacitly recognizes this difficulty by drawing a nonconstitutional distinction between misdemeanors requiring full criminal safeguards and "petty" misdemeanors involving the sanctions of imprisonment for not more than six months or fires of not more than $500, for
which such safeguards are not statutorily required. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1(3), 30,06A(b) (1976).
See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 45 n.2; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-73
(1970). However, as indicated infra, the difficulty is important in the Sixth Amendment
context only if severity is the controllingconsideration, rather than merely one of a cluster of
relevant factors. The latter proposition would seem to comport best with the dicta in more
recent cases. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960) (severity of sanction not
determinative of penal character); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 n.18 (1958) (severity, in
conjunction with other circumstances, is relevant in deciding whether a law is punitive).
See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
242. In Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court applied precisely this test. It
held that a $10,000 criminal contempt fine against a union did not warrant Sixth Amendment jury-trial protections because:
we cannot accept the proposition that a contempt must be considered a serious
crime under all circumstances where the punishment is a fine of more than $500,
unaccompanied by imprisonment. It is one thing to hold that deprivation of an
individual's liberty beyond a six-month term should not be imposed without the
protections of a jury trial, but it is quite another to suggest that, regardless of the
circumstances, a jury is required where any fine greater than $500 is contemplated. . . . This union. . . collects dues from some 13,000 persons; and although
the fine is not insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude that the union was deprived
of whatever right to jury trial it might have ....
Id at 477. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court similarly indicated that
the proper test for Sixth Amendment counsel requirements was whether imprisonment was
likely to occur as the particular provision was applied, rather than whether imprisonment
was authorized. Id at 38-39 & n.10.
243. See, e.g., Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1) (1970);
Highway Traffic Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1976); Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1) (1976).
244. OSHA's civil penalties must take into account the cited employer's size, good faith
safety efforts and past safety history, as well as the gravity of the violation in terms of numbers of employees exposed to danger and the duration of their exposure. See 29 U.S.C. §
666(i) (1970). Due to these statutory factors, penalties proposed by the Secretary for firstinstance violations have generally been far below the potential maxima prescribed. From
July 1, 1975, through April 30, 1976, for example, they averaged $617 for serious violations,
$409 for repeated and willful violations, and $12 for non-serious violations. Occupational
Safety and Health Admin., Data Center, June 1976. Generally speaking, relatively low
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proper rational attribution test can be useful. Where the congressional
intent evinced by the legislative history underlying the challenged sanction is not clearly punitive, the presence of a significant nonpenal purpose to which that sanction may realistically be attributed might well
be controlling. This result would seem to follow whether the justifying
purpose appears on the face of the statute or may be inferred from its
legislative development.245
penalties have also been proposed for failures to abate in accordance with prior orders, since
the Secretary's policy has been to reinspect swiftly and proceed to file non-abatement notices
or seek summary enforcement of outstanding orders, rather than permitting daily penalties
to accumulate indefinitely. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(b), 660(b), 666(d) (1970). See also Brennan v. Winters Battery Mfg. Co., 531 F.2d 317, 321-22 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S.
991 (1976). That substantial penalties may nevertheless accumulate between issuance of an
order and re-inspection by government agents would appear to create no independent claim
to criminal safeguards where continued violation with notice of an outstanding final abatement order is involved. See generally United States v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 420
U.S. 223, 233-38 (1975); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115,
1118-21 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 438-39 (2d Cir.
1974). As these cases indicate, such conduct is the administrative analogue of civil contempt, but nevertheless triggers less grave sanctions than the conditional imprisonment occasioned by an act of contempt. Cf., e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975), discussedin
note 242 supra. Indeed, this context of non-abatement is perhaps the only situation where
the argument that flat money penalties are remedial and compensatory-designed to preserve the integrity of the statute's enforcement processes and hence to be construed liberally-possesses some intrinsic merit.
245. Careful application of this rational attribution test, which should consider the sanction's logical effect as well as the relationship of that effect to the statute's goals and the
power under which Congress acted, would hopefully minimie the possibility of unprincipled conclusions like those reached in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), see notes
144-160 and accompanying text supra.
In any event, a compelling non-punitive reason for OSHA's "civil" money penalties
may readily be identified. The Act covers nearly sixty-five million workers in five million
workplaces, but is funded by current appropriations for less than sixteen hundred inspectors
to perform its enforcement tasks. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH FOR 1973, at 57-60 (1975); PUB. L. No. 94-439, 90
Stat. 1418, 1420-21 (1976). The Congress enacting OSHA was acutely aware of the need to
provide a powerful incentive for employer self-compliance because adequate numbers of
trained inspectors would be in critically short supply for an indefinite time. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 21-22 (1970), reprintedin LEG. HIST., supra note
7, at 152, 161-62; H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 31 (1970), reprintedinLEG.
HIST., supra note 7, at 852, 861. See also 116 CONG. REc. 36536 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
Saxbe). And it recounted in detail the scope of the drastic problem such compliance was
meant to ameliorate:
14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents. . . during the
past four years more Americans have been killed where they work than in the
Vietnam war. By the lowest count 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each
year, resulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work-many times more than
are lost through strikes. In addition to the individual human tragedies involved,
the economic mpact of industrial deaths and disability is staggerng. Over $1.5
billion is wasted m lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is
estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen's compensation benefits and medical
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With respect to OSHA's limited "civil" money penalties, however,
it was probably unnecessary to reach these refinements. Neither the

potential nor the actual effects of those penalties on regulated businesses appear to have been unduly severe. 46 Moreover, their alterna-

tive nonpunitive purpose-encouraging prompt self-discovery and
correction of occupational hazards, rather than inviting employers to
await an inspector's appearance before taking steps to protect their employees---did not need to be inferred.
face.24 7

It was clear on the statute's

In any event, decisions by courts of appeal uniformly sustaining
OSHA's civil penalties continued to be handed down. :48 The Supreme

Court effectively settled the civil-criminal issue as to OSHA, both by
denying certiorari on the Sixth Amendment question in Atlas and Irey
while granting it on a Seventh Amendment question also raised in
those cases,2 49 and by attributing a plainly nonpunitive purpose to

identical penalties under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
expenses. This "grim current scene"... represents a worsening trend, for...
the number of disabling injuries per million man hours worked is today 20% higher
than in 1958....
S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1970), reprintedinLEG. HIsT., supra note 7, at
142-44. See also H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-16 (1970), reprintedinLEG.
HIsT., supranote 7, at 844-86. As Senator Dominick, among others, noted: "[W]e could not
possibly find enough inspectors to impose upon this vast area ... and ... number of peopie... a bill which people will not voluntarily comply with in a great majority of...
cases." LEG. HIST., supranote 7, at 471. The Act's civil penalties were simply intended to
prod employers to engage in such voluntary self-enforcement. See text accompanying note
247 infra.
246. See note 244 supra.
247. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283, 1292 (6th Cir. 1976); Brennan v.
OSHRC (Interstate Glass Co.), 487 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1973).
Though differently phrased, Professor Goldschmid's test has the same basic thrust as
that suggested by the preceding two text paragraphs:
Money penalties designated "civil" by Congress should be beyond serious [constitutional]challenge if they: (1) are rationally related to a regulatory. . scheme; (2)
do not deal with offenses which are mala in se (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery and
other crimes which are traditionally and widely recognized outrages and threats to
common security); (3) may be expected to have a prophylactic or remedial effect.
Goldschmid, supra note 22, at 914-15.
248. Mohawk Excavating, Inc. v. OSHRC, 549 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1977); Clarkson
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451, 455-56 (10th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Winters Battery
Mfg. Co., 531 F.2d 317, 325 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976); Bloomfield
Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1257, 1263 (3d Cir. 1975); Beall Constr.
Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1974); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v.
OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 515 (8th Cir. 1974). Cf Underhill Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor, 526 F.2d 53, 57 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975).
One state supreme court has reached similar results vis-a-vis analogous state provisions,
with no more extended explanation. Fry Roofing Co. v. Colorado Dep't of Health Air
Pollution Variance Bd., 553 P.2d 800, 805-06 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
249. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 424 U.S. 964 (1976).
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Moreover, in rejecting a Seventh Amendment civil jury

trial claim in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC,5 1 the Court appeared actually to adopt the as-applied analysis suggested above, citing Muniz v.
Hoffman212 for the proposition that "if the fines involved in these
[OSHA] cases were made criminal fines instead of civil fines ... [t~he

Sixth Amendment would then govern the employer's right to a jury and
2 53 This statement
under ourpriorcases nojury trialwould be required."
implies that the limited effect of statutorily-restricted money penalties

may be sufficient per se to preclude application of allthe Sixth Amendment's safeguards, even where the stigmatizing influence of an express
criminal label is involved.2 54 The presence of a nonpenal purpose to
which OSHA's lesser regulatory sanctions may also be referred only
strengthens that conclusion.

Conclusion
Issues of classification are always difficult, since the very concept
of a class involves abstractions which are inherently arbitrary in the
sense that a fairly wide range of distinguishing characteristics is usually
available, any of which might be made controlling by mutual agreement. In jurisprudential terms, classification involves linedrawing, and

a priori assumptions underlying the lines actually drawn are constantly
being challenged by hard cases. Those difficulties are magnified in the
250. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-878 (1970). Section 109 of the Coal Act, 30 U.S.C. § 819(a)(1)
(1970), chiefly authorized imposition of "civil" penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation
of mandatory mine safety or health standards. The Court unanimously stated that this
section's
importance... in the enforcement of the Act cannot be overstated. Section 109
provides a strong incentive for compliance with the mandatory health and safety
standards. That the violations.. . have been abated. . . before § 109 comes into
effect is not dispositive; if a mine operator does not also face a monetary penalty
for violations, he has little incentive to eliminate dangers until directed to do so by
a mine inspector. The inspections may be as infrequent as four a year. A major
objective of Congress was prevention of accidents and disasters; the deterrence provided by monetary sanctions is essential to that objective.
National Independent Coal Operators' Ass'n. v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 401 (1976).
251. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
252. 422 U.S. 454 (1975). See note 242 supra.
253. 430 U.S. 442,460 n.15 (1977) (emphasis added). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 677-82 (1977).
254. The Court has repeatedly suggested that the right to a criminal jury trial may be
paramount among the protections afforded by the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152-53, 157 (1973); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-87, 100-01 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155-56 (1968); Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1935). But cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1971) (Fourteenth Amendment does not require jury trial in
quasi-criminal state juvenile proceedings).
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civil-criminal area, where classification becomes necessary to determine whether specific constitutional strictures- apply to the procedures
used to enforce a given sanction. Indeed, most of the criteria applied by
the Supreme Court to determine whether an Act of Congress is "penal
or regulatory," 2" and hence outside the ambit of the Sixth Amendment, have not really grappled with the critical problems of congressional and judicial power inherent in that determination. That a
statute imposes affirmative restraints for violations of its provisions, or
"prescribes the consequence that will befall one who fails to abide by
' can scarcely be dispositive. These func. . . regulatory provisions,"256
tions are performed by all sanctions. Nor, for example, can meaningful
classification rest on the fact that the violative conduct is elsewhere
made criminal, or that Congress has simultaneously prescribed two
sanctions for such conduct and designated only one as penal. Except
in the most indirect way, these elements do not define the status of the
sanction being challenged. Congress' undoubted power to create civil
and criminal sanctions for the same conduct cannot foreclose further
analysis, if the Amendment is to remain a meaningful safeguard of individual rights. The decisions purporting to apply these criteria to
easy cases in which the challenged sanction was severe by any standard
have obscured more relevant modes of analysis, both because they focus upon peripheral factors and because they apply inconsistently the
very criteria that they announce.257 Decisions dealing with borderline
cases have compounded these difficulties by rote repetition of slogans
developed in the easier decisions, without engaging in further reasoning or recognizing the problems inherent in the results such slogans
yield.258
Of course, the Court's unprincipled approach to the civil-criminal
classification issue may be at least partially explained, if not justified,
by reference to the historical setting of its various rulings. Thus, for
example, in an era of small government, decisions striking down federal regulatory sanctions because they coerce conduct and hence invade
state police powers become at least understandable.2 59 Decisions like
UnitedStatesex rel Marcus v. Hess 6° or Flemming v. Nestor26 ' may be
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
Drexel
260.
261.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (plurality opinion).
See notes 28-159 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 160-205 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). See also Bailey v.
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
317 U.S. 537 (1943). See notes 124-134 and accompanying text supra.
363 U.S. 603 (1960). See notes 144-159 and accompanying text supra.
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ascribable to external pressures generated by the Second World War
and McCarthyism. 262 But reference to history explains neither the lack
of meaningful analysis in these decisions, nor the Court's continued

failure to develop a consistent principle by which to determine the status of sanctions alleged to require criminal safeguards for their imposi-

tion. To suggest that monetary sanctions are intrinsically penal,263 and
then deem them to be inherently civil and remedial, 2 4 scarcely furthers

the assumption of predictable continuity on which the concept of a
judge-made body of constitutional law ought to rest. To say that there
is no constitutional difference between criminal fines and civil monetary forfeitures2 65 or to hold that the safeguards of criminal process are
necessary
where Congress employs forfeitures to reach guilty conduct,266 but almost immediately thereafter to rule that forfeitures intended to punish both innocent and culpable persons are "civil" in
character,26 7 is to deny the citizen procedural protections to which he

appears properly entitled.
However, as in non-constitutional areas, 268 much light may' be
shed by considering what function is performed by the very act of clas-

sifying sanctions as civil or criminal. Put starkly, the Sixth Amendment's fundamental purpose is to provide the most stringent procedural
safeguards only in those instances where the severity of the sanction

being imposed warrants conferring such protection upon the individual
being sanctioned. 269 Apart from prosecutions for felony and similar
262. Indeed, in Nestor, a dissenter observed:
The fact that the Court is sustaining this action indicates the extent to which people
are willing to go these days to overlook violations of the Constitution perpetrated
against anyone who has ever even innocently belonged to the Communist
Party. . . . [Nestor], now 69 years old, has been driven out of the country...
under an Act authorizin& his deportation many years after his Communist membership. . . . Now a similar expostfacto law deprives him of his insurance.., in
accord with the general fashion of the day-that is, to punish in every way possible
anyone who ever made the mistake of being a Communist in this country ...
363 U.S. at 622, 627 (Black, J., dissenting). See also id at 632-34 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922); Helwig v. United States,
188 U.S. 605 (1903). See notes 67-104 and accompanying text supra.
264. See, e.g., United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See notes 105-134 and accompanying text supra.
265. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971). See
notes 167-176 and accompanying text supra.
266. See id at 721-22 & n.8.
267. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See notes 186205 and accompanying text supra.
268. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability:,A FunctionalAnaosis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. Rlv. 367 (1968).
269. See, eg., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Frankfurter & Corco-
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situations in which the correct classification is obvious, this principle
cannot by itself resolve concrete cases. But in light of this principle,
two factors that have been utilized by the courts in this
sphere-scrutiny of legislative intent and consideration of the challenged sanction's effect-assume a decisive importance. The Court
has often exhibited a willingness to defer to specific expressions of legislative intent in its effort to determine other constitutional issues,

notwithstanding the facially suspect nature of the particular provision
being challenged.270 Depending on one's perspective, such deference
may either be hailed as a return to "the original constitutional proposi-

tion,"2 7 1 or decried as an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility
under article three of the Constitution.2 72 The fact remains that insofar as legislation enacted by Congress reflects the will of society, and
insofar as Congress is the forum constitutionally designated to strike
the initial balance between those sanctions requiring the procedural
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment and those for which "a swift and
[more] convenient remedy" should prevail, 273 its intent clearly is relevant. This is particularly true where the sanctions at issue are limited
money penalties exacted for regulatory offenses that carry no moral
stigma, and that have consistently been treated, in colonial as well as
present practice, as "petty" violations having effects that are insufficient to invoke the Sixth Amendment's mandate.2 74 Indeed, in the

area of social regulation intent and effect appear inextricably intertwined, since the purpose of a congressionally-prescribed program and
its implementing sanctions will generally determine the extent to which
ran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial b r Jury, 39 HARv. L.
REv. 917 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter & Corcoran], cited in Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 n.5 (1970). See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-77 (1975).
270. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-20 (1977) (social security statute
favoring females over males in computation of old age benefits; court deferred to congressional judgment regarding the need to remedy past gender-based discrimination); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-16, 423-24 (1976) (court deferred to congressional judgment that it is reasonable to have a postal agent make an arrest without a warrant).
271. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
272. See, e.g., Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1208, 1213-14 (3rd Cir.
1974) (Gibbons, ., dissenting).
273. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 269, at 927. See also id, at 928-33, 936, 953-54,
961, concluding that despite regulatory fines as high as 500 pounds "the settled practice in
which the founders of the American colonies grew up reserved for the justices [of the peace]
innumerable cases in which the balance of social convenience, as expressed in legislation,
insisted that proceedings be concluded speedily and inexpensively." Id at 933.
274. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supranote 269, at 968, 981; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(1970); Hart, The Aias ofthe CriminalLaw, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
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society will attach a stigma to sanctioned violations.2 75 In this fullyarticulated sense, the Court's somewhat nebulous distinction between

"penal" and "regulatory" statutes does have meaning.

This analysis suggests distinct criteria which may generally be employed to determine whether a regulatory sanction that Congress has
labeled "civil" is sufficiently criminal in effect to require implementa-

tion of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment as a prerequisite to its
imposition. It also suggests ordered relationships between these criteria. Where the sanction's facial impact on those regulated is not so severe as to "shock the conscience" '76 and a nonpunitive purpose,

reasonably related to the statute's aims and to the constitutional power
under which Congress acted, may fairly be inferred from the text of the
enactment itself, that determination should end further inquiry.

Where a rational nonpunitive purpose may not easily be attributed to
the sanction on its face, resort to analysis of subjective congressional

intent, as indicated by the legislative history, will usually supply either
the justifying inference or a sound basis for it. Of course, the cardinal
rule in this area is that the existence of any state of facts that may reasonably be presumed to justify the enactment suffices to validate it,

even if Congress never considered such facts at the time of enactment.277 Beyond that presumption, allegations that a regulatory sanction's effect on particular persons warrants the heavy social costs of
implementing the Sixth Amendment's safeguards would appear appropriately to be relegated, on an ad hoc basis, to the "gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion '278 that has been one of the great bulwarks of our constitutional jurisprudence. That evolutionary, case-by275. Where Congress means to impose formal punishment, the sanctions and procedures
employed will generally be perceived as invoking the stigma associated with condemnation.
Cf., e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 632-33, 634-35 (1960) (Douglas & Brennan, JJ.,
dissenting). Where it means only to enforce responsibility rather than attach blame, it
seems fair to assume that the same type of stigmatization will not generally result. See
Hart, supra note 274, at 402-06.
276. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
277. For general statements to this effect in the context of decisions involving analogous
equal protection claims, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64
(1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
278. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958) (plurality opinion) (quoting Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)). Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,680-82 (1977)
(societal burden of requiring a hearing prior to imposition of corporal punishment in public
schools precludes the Court from mandating such a hearing as a constitutional requirement).
For an example of such a process in the context of the Fourth Amendment, compare See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) with United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17
(1972).
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case approach seems especially fitting where alleged individual grievances may promptly be reviewed by a centralized administrative
agency expressly designated to determine the facts on which such allegations are based.279

279. See N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 265-67 (1975). See also Keystone Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 960,963-64 (3rd Cir. 1976); In re Restland Memorial Park, 540
F.2d 626, 628 (3rd Cir. 1976).

